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Abstract
File system security is fundamental to the security of UNIX and Linux systems since in
these systems almost everything is in the form of a file. To protect the system files and
other sensitive user files from unauthorized accesses, certain security schemes are chosen
and used by different organizations in their computer systems. A file system security model
provides a formal description of a protection system. Each security model is associated
with specified security policies which focus on one or more of the security principles:
confidentiality, integrity and availability. The security policy is not only about “who” can
access an object, but also about “how” a subject can access an object. To enforce the
security policies, each access request is checked against the specified policies to decide
whether it is allowed or rejected.
The current protection schemes in UNIX/Linux systems focus on the access control.
Besides the basic access control scheme of the system itself, which includes permission
bits, setuid and seteuid mechanism and the root, there are other protection models, such as
Capabilities, Domain Type Enforcement (DTE) and Role-Based Access Control (RBAC),
supported and used in certain organizations. These models protect the confidentiality of the
data directly. The integrity of the data is protected indirectly by only allowing trusted users
to operate on the objects. The access control decisions of these models depend on either
the identity of the user or the attributes of the process the user can execute, and the attributes
of the objects. Adoption of these sophisticated models has been slow; this is likely due to
the enormous complexity of specifying controls over a large file system and the need for
system administrators to learn a new paradigm for file protection.
We propose a new security model: file system firewall. It is an adoption of the familiar
network firewall protection model, used to control the data that flows between networked
xii

computers, toward file system protection. This model can support decisions of access
control based on any system generated attributes about the access requests, e.g., time of
day. The access control decisions are not on one entity, such as the account in traditional
discretionary access control or the domain name in DTE. In file system firewall, the access
decisions are made upon situations on multiple entities. A situation is programmable with
predicates on the attributes of subject, object and the system. File system firewall specifies
the appropriate actions on these situations. We implemented the prototype of file system
firewall on SUSE Linux. Preliminary results of performance tests on the prototype indicate
that the runtime overhead is acceptable. We compared file system firewall with TE in
SELinux to show that firewall model can accommodate many other access control models.
Finally, we show the ease of use of firewall model. When firewall system is restricted to
specified part of the system, all the other resources are not affected. This enables a
relatively smooth adoption. This fact and that it is a familiar model to system administrators
will facilitate adoption and correct use. The user study we conducted on traditional UNIX
access control, SELinux and file system firewall confirmed that. The beginner users found
it easier to use and faster to learn then traditional UNIX access control scheme and SELinux.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The traditional protection scheme used within UNIX (and Linux) systems has been proven
inadequate to meet modern concerns for system security. The UNIX systems were not
designed with a lot of consideration for security. It only had a basic access control scheme
which has not been improved much from the original design. The main problems in original
UNIX protection system are listed below:

First is the discretionary access control (DAC). DAC is the predominant access control
mechanism in traditional UNIX systems. It means which subject can access a certain object
and how the subject can access the object are controlled by the owner of that object. A
process started by a user can access and modify any object the user has access to. This is
dangerous in that attackers can exploit certain vulnerability of that process and let the
process execute malicious code. Now the malicious code can operate on any object the
process has access to. So we need mandatory access control (MAC) over the DAC to
constrict what a subject can do.

Second is the coarse-grained access control. In UNIX systems, access decisions are made
based on the identity of the user (UID) and the group(s) the user belongs to (GID). To a
certain object, users are divided into three types: the owner, the users in the same group
with the owner and all the other users. The possible permissions include only read, write
and execute. This coarse-grained access control makes it cumbersome or impossible to
apply certain security policies.
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Last is the root account. The root account, or the super user, has unlimited privilege and
can access and modify any object. The super power the root has been the main target of
security attacks since with the root privilege, a user or a process can access, modify or
delete any file. With DAC, setuid and setgid mechanism, the situation only gets worse. If
attackers get a process run with root privilege to execute their malicious code, they can
destroy the whole system. So there should be some mechanism to tone down the super
power of the root account.

A lot of research has been done to provide more secure protections to the file system and
avert these issues over the years. The most well-known security models that have been
implemented are DTE, RBAC and POSIX Capabilities. They all focus on providing finergrained access control and they all confine the super power of the root account in some
way. Linux Security Module (LSM) is the most well-known security framework that
supports these more complicated models.

It is already included in some distributions of Linux. But there are some issues with these
security models which stops them from being used widely. One reason is that these models
are complicated to use. To use these models, we need to design the right capability sets for
each process, the right domain and type for each process and file , and the right roles for
each user. Then we still need to set up the whole system. For example, to use Capabilities,
one needs to decide for each process the right inheritable, permitted, and effective
capabilities. The inheritance set adds more complexity to the work. To make DTE work,
one needs to carefully define the domains and types, then tag each subject with the right
domain and tag each subject with the right type. Even after we get all these done, the work
to set up the system is not a trivial job. For RBAC, because of its nature, it is useful more
in systems where the roles are easily recognized and they have different responsibilities.
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So it is more popular in special organizations such as government, bank and health care
systems.

We propose the file system firewall model which can be seen as an extra layer to the current
security system in UNIX systems. It incorporates a filter and uses this filter to filter out the
illegal access requests, just like the network firewall. When there is an access request, the
firewall system will check the filter rules to see if the object of the access request has rules
defined. If no matching rules are found, the control will be passed onto the original access
control system. On the other hand, if there are some matching rules, the firewall will check
the attributes of the access requests against the rules to get an action. The action can be
“allow”, “deny” or “redirection”. Redirection means the access request is diverted from
one subject or one object to another subject or object.

This firewall system is built into the kernel to make sure it is efficient and protected from
being bypassed or compromised by a rogue application.

Compared with other security models, the firewall model has the following advantages.
First, it can specify much more complex access control policies. The conditions on which
to perform the specified actions are programmable on multiple attributes. Second, it is a
general model that can accommodate different security policies. It can simulate other
access control models using different attributes. Most importantly, firewall model is
relatively easy to use compared to other access control systems. The adoption of the
firewall model is not aggressively all or nothing. It can be done gradually by setting up
access control rules on part of the system, which does not affect the rest of the system. It
is easy to set up and maintain. Our user study shows that beginner users are more likely to
use firewall model than UNIX access control scheme and SELinux and they can learn to
use it relatively fast.

3

The contributions we have made in our work:
1. Design the file system firewall model.
2. Implement the prototype of file system firewall model on SUSE Linux.
3. Conduct the functional tests and performance tests on the prototype.
4. Theoretical comparisons of file system firewall with TE in SELinux.
5. Study the usability of access control systems and design a user study on access
control systems.
6. Conduct a user study on three access control systems, analyze the results and
provide suggestions to improve usability access control systems.
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces background information
about file system protection and network firewalls. Chapter 3 describes the related work.
In Chapter 4, we describe the motivations behind the firewall model for file system
protection and the definitions of the firewall model. Chapter 5 is the prototype
implementation of the firewall model and the performance tests. In Chapter 6, we explain
in more details about the redirection feature in file system firewall. The comparison of
firewall model is discussed in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 describes the user study on access
control systems is. Chapter 9 is the conclusion.
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Chapter 2
Background
The main content in this section includes introduction of the UNIX/Linux operating
systems and file systems, important concepts in access control systems, security principles
and the enhanced access control extensions and current security protections in UNIX/Linux
systems. Since our file system firewall model borrows some ideas from the network
firewall, we will include an introduction to the network firewall as well.

2.1 UNIX/Linux Operating Systems
UNIX was originally developed in 1969 by a group of AT&T employees at Bell Labs [58].
Today UNIX is still famous for its simplicity, power and safety. As the owner of the UNIX
trademark, The Open Group has separated the UNIX trademark from any actual code
stream itself [45], so there are multiple different implementations of UNIX systems such
as Solaris, HP-UX and IBM’s AIX. An open consensus specification, called Single UNIX
Specification, defines the requirements for a UNIX system. Only systems that are fully
compliant with and certified to the Single UNIX Specification can use the trademark;
others are called “UNIX system-like” or “UNIX-like”. The most popular UNIX-like
systems are GNU/Linux and Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD). Linux is relatively
new, having been originally written in 1991. Due to it being free and open source software,
it is receiving more and more attention in both the academic and the industrial worlds.
Some well-known distributions include Debian, Gentoo, Red Hat/Fedora and SUSE. For
BSD, the most well- known BSD descendants are the major open source BSDs: FreeBSD,
NetBSD and OpenBSD. Our research are done on Linux systems since it is free software,
but it can apply to UNIX systems.
5

2.2 File System, Super Block, Inode
UNIX/Linux systems view a file as a stream of bytes that can be modified in length, as
well as read and written at any specified position. Files can be of different types, such as
ordinary files, directory files, special device files, link files, pipes or sockets. These files
are all organized in a directory tree. The system in UNIX or Linux that manages files is
called the file system [43, 44]. The file system deals with how to name and store files, how
to protect files, how to share files and how to let the user create and access files.
UNIX/Linux file systems support many file system types. We list some well-known
systems below:
• Ext2: Devised for Linux.
• Ext3: The ext2 file system enhanced with journaling capabilities. Ext3 allows fast file
system recovery, and it supports POSIX AccessControl Lists (ACLs).
• Ext4: Ex4 file system was introduced in 2008. It modifies important data structures of
the filesystem and provides improved design and better performance. It supports new
features such as huge individual file size and overall file system size, bigger directory
capacity, etc.
• Isofs (iso9660): Used by CDROM file system.
• Sysfs: A RAM-based (in memory) file system initially based on ramfs. Sysfs is used to
export kernel objects to user space.
• Procfs: The proc file system acts as an interface to internal data structures in the kernel.
It can be used to obtain information about the system and to change certain kernel
parameters at run-time using sysctl command.
• VFAT: Short for virtual FAT (file allocation table). A Linux file system compatible with
Microsoft Windows95 and Windows NT long file names on the FAT file system.
• NFS: Network file system.
• NTFS: The standard file system of Windows NT.
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These file systems are different, but each of them contains four parts: a boot block, a super
block, an inode list and data blocks as shown in the following chart.
Table 1 Filesystem Structure
Boot Super

Block Block

Inode List

Data
Blocks

The boot block is located in the first several sectors including the initial bootstrap program
to load the operating system [2]. The super block contains all the key information about
the file system, such as a magic number to identify the file system type, the number of
blocks in the file system, and other key administrative information [2]. The inode (index
node) is the basic unit of files in the kernel and it stores the key information about a file,
such as file address, link count, access mode, individual owner and group owner of the file.
The inode list is created when a file system is created. Each file has a unique inode and is
identified by an inode number in the file system where it resides. Two files can have the
same inode numbers in two file systems, but not the same file system. The inode list is a
static list of inodes. Once the file system is created, the size of the list cannot change. The
initial size of the inode list is determined by the administrator and the size of the storage
device. Data blocks contain the actual data in the form of directories and files.

2.3 Virtual File System (VFS)
UNIX/Linux systems provide a common interface, VFS, to the different file systems for
application programs. VFS is a software layer in the kernel of the operating system. It
manages kernel level file abstractions in one file format for all mounted file systems. So
now the users can interact with the VFS no matter what type of file system the users are
accessing. Even if they access several different file systems, they can still use the common
system calls provided by the VFS. The VFS will then translate the system calls to
appropriate operations within the appropriate file system. The VFS has a vnode structure
for each active node (file or directory). The vnode contains a numerical designator for a
7

network-wide unique file [44]. The figure below shows how application programs interact
with file systems through the VFS.

User Request
(System Call)

VFS

EXT2

EXT3

……

VFAT

Figure 1: Virtual File System

2.4 Terminology in Access Control
Access control is the part of an operating system that deals with who can access a file and
how he can access the file. Before we start to introduce different security models, schemes
and extensions in UNIX/Linux systems, we will explain the terminology associated with
access control.

2.4.1 Subject and Object
In any of the access control models and frameworks, there are three basic concepts: subject,
object and access rights.
Subjects are the active objects, like processes and users.
Objects are protected entities, such as files and processes.
Access rights are the operations one subject can perform over objects or other subjects,
such as enable, disable, read, write, execute, etc.
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2.4.2 MAC and DAC
Access control can be grouped into two types: Mandatory Access Control (MAC) or
Discretionary Access Control (DAC).
MAC is a type of access control in which the security levels and clearances are defined by
the administrators, and the control rules between subjects and objects are enforced by the
operating system or security kernel. Even if a subject owns a file, the subject cannot pass
any permissions to other subjects, that is, the permissions are defined by the system and
cannot be changed by a single normal user.
DAC is another type of access control defined as “a means of restricting access to objects
based on the identity of subjects and/or groups to which they belong” [18]. The controls
are discretionary in the sense that a subject with a certain access permission is capable of
passing that permission (perhaps indirectly) onto any other subject (unless restrained by
mandatory access control) [18]. So the access control to the objects is at the discretion of
the user. An object’s owner, who is usually also the objects creator, has discretionary
authority over who else may access that object. For instance, in UNIX, the owner of a
certain file can change the permissions of the file he owns and determine if another can
access the file.
Some access control models are MAC, some are DAC and some are the hybrid of the two.
MAC is used more often in the government and the military.

2.4.3 Principles of Computer Security
Confidentiality, integrity and availability are the key principles of computer security. Every
access control model will have its own focus among these three principles. Confidentiality
means that only authorized users can access certain information. An unauthorized access
request should be denied. Integrity means that information should only be modified
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properly by appropriate people. Availability means that the information is accessible by
the authorized users.

2.5 Access Control Models, Schemes and Extensions
2.5.1 Multilevel Security
Multi-level security (MLS) is a security scheme in which both objects and subjects have
security levels. Whether a subject can access an object or other subjects depends on the
security levels of both the subject and the target of the access request. In 1970s and 1980s,
a lot of research attention was paid to MLS and the most famous model that implements
MLS are the Biba model and the Bell-LaPadula model. The Bell-Lapadula model focuses
on confidentiality, so it is used mostly in military and government organizations. The Biba
model focuses on integrity, so it is used mostly in industry.

2.5.2 Access Control Matrix
The access control matrix (ACM) uses a matrix to store the rights a certain subject has over
a certain object. Let S be the set of subjects, O be the set of objects and R be the set of
rights. A matrix M is used to describe the rights each subject has over each object or subject.
Let us make each row is about a subject and each column is about an object, then each
matrix entry is the access rights that subject has for that object. That is, if s  אS, and o  אO,
then M[s, o]  كR is the set of rights s has over o.
ACM is very straightforward to understand and it can be used for any specific security
policies, but as the number of files and users get larger, the matrix might take too much
space. Especially when most of the entries in the matrix are either blank or default, it is
really not space-efficient to store the whole matrix. There are two optimizations of ACM
model. One is Access Control Lists, and the other is Capabilities.
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2.5.3 Access Control Lists
An access control List (ACL) is like one column of the access control matrix. Each object
has associated with it a set of pairs, with each pair containing a subject and a set of rights
[1]. The subject has the defined rights over the object. One example would be
acl(file a) = {(p1, {read,write}), (p2, {read})}.
This means p1 can read and write file a; p2 can read file a. UNIX’s permission bits can be
seen as an abbreviated version of an ACL. The complete version of ACL is supported in
some UNIX/Linux systems. ACLs are an addition to the standard UNIX file permissions
bits for User, Group, and Other. ACLs provide fine-grained control over who can read,
write, and execute files. This can all be done without the use of UNIX groups and their
associated administrative overhead. Windows systems also use ACLs.

2.5.4 Capabilities
The Capabilities model is another variant of ACM. If we think of an access control list as
a column in the access control matrix, then a capability would be the row of the access
control matrix. Each subject has associated with it a set of pairs, with each pair containing
an object and a set of rights. The subject associated with this list can access the named
object in any of the ways indicated by the named rights [1]. One example could be
cap(process a) = {(file 1, {read,write}), (file 2, {read})}.
This means process a can read and write file 1. And it can read file 2. The capabilities
model is supported in Linux starting from kernel 2.2, and it is also supported by Secure
Linux Framework.

2.5.5 Domain and Type Enforcement (DTE)
DTE [3, 38, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11] is based on type enforcement (TE). TE groups the
system into subjects and objects. An invariant access control attribute called a domain is
associated with each subject, and another invariant attribute called a type is associated with
each information object [3]. DTE uses two tables, the Domain Definition Table (DDT) and
the Domain Interaction Table (DIT). The DDT defines the allowed interactions between
11

domains and types, that is, subjects to objects. The DIT defines the allowed interactions
between subjects. So whether an access request is granted or not depends on the related
settings in these two tables. If the access attempt is defined in the table, then the access is
granted, otherwise it is denied. TE can be seen as an improved version of ACM, in that it
reduces the matrix size by grouping subjects into domains, and objects into types.
On top of TE, in DTE, a domain is defined as a tuple (entry point, access rights to object
types, and access rights to subjects in other domains). Entry points are executables. When
these executables run, they are in this specified domain. A process running in domain A
may transit to another domain only by executing one of B’s entry point programs [6]. DTE
improves TE in two ways: 1. DTE defines its own language, DTE language (DTEL) to
specify the access control configurations. 2. DTE file security attributes are not stored oneto-one with files on disk [7], but using an implicit typing mechanism based on the directory
hierarchy [35]. This separates the implementation of these attributes from the file system
and makes DTE more practical.

2.5.6 Role Based Access Control (RBAC)
With RBAC [12, 13, 14, 15, 67, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66], administrators create roles
according to the job functions performed in a company or organization, grant permissions
to those roles, and then assign users to the roles on the basis of their specific job
responsibilities and qualifications [59]. A user might have several roles, and can change
from one role to another. The roles can have new permissions or revoke old permissions.
The central notion of Role-Based Access Control is that users do not have discretionary
access to enterprise objects. Instead, access permissions are administratively associated
with roles, and users are administratively made members of appropriate roles [12]. No
consensus on the requirements of RBAC exists, so there are different variations of RBAC.
Some RBAC can set mutually exclusive roles while some might give a user the right to
grant access, which makes it discretionary. RBAC can support the least privilege principle
and the separation of duties principle.
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RBAC is not just one model; instead it has a family of models that form a family tree [12].
Each RBAC belongs to one of the four categories, base model, role hierarchies, constraints
and consolidated model. The base model is the minimum requirement for an RBAC system;
it is the root of the family tree. Role hierarchies and constraints are separately built on top
of the base model, that is, they both include the base model. The role hierarchy model adds
hierarchies where inheritance happens between roles. One role may contain other roles.
For example, some transactions or operations might be the same for all the users. It will be
simple to associate a role with these operations. This role can be included in other roles.
This forms a role hierarchy. The constraints model adds constraints to the model. For
example, to support “separation of duty” or “mutual exclusion”, constraints need to be put
on the assignment of users to roles [60]. The consolidated model is built on both hierarchy
model and constraints model, so it includes both.
DTE and RBAC are similar in that DTE groups users into domains, while RBAC groups
users into roles, and these domains or roles decide what rights they have over objects.
People also combine these two together [14, 15] in some cases to provide finer grained
access control than plain DTE or RBAC.
RBAC is designed for enterprises or government where we can divide the functionalities
into distinct roles, and it is well-accepted and used in government, bank, health care and
other commercial organizations. RBAC is built into Solaris (since S8) and supported by
Sun, AIX of IBM, HP-UX and SELinux. RBAC is so popular that in 2000, NIST called
for a unified standard for RBAC. This standard was revised in 2004, and they are calling
for another revision in 2009.

2.5.7 Locks and Keys
The locks and keys technique combines features of access control lists and capabilities [1].
A piece of information (the lock) is associated with the object and a second piece of
information (the key) is associated with those subjects authorized to access the object [1].
The key also contains the information about how the subject can access the object. When
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a subject wants to access an object, the key is checked to see if it corresponds to any locks
of the object. If it matches, access of the allowed type is granted. Cryptography is used in
almost all key-lock systems.

2.6 HRU Model and the Safety Problem
One of the most important problems in access control systems is the decidability of safety
problem. A protection system is defined to be safe with a permission or a right, only if the
permission or right could not be leaked by the system. Harrison, Ruzzo and Ullman [1,131]
gave a formal definition of the safety problem on a generalized formal model (HRU model)
of protection systems. The results show for HRU model that it is not decidable whether a
protection system is safe with a right.

2.6.1 HRU Model
In HRU model [131], a protection system is defined as a state-transition system on a set O
of objects, a set S of subjects and an access control matrix A. A state Ti is a triple (Oi, Si,
Ai). The protection system has two parts: a finite set of generic rights R and a finite set C
of commands. The commands has the following forms.
command α(X1, X2 , . . ., Xk)
if
rl in A(Xs1, Xo1) and
r2 in A(Xs2, Xo2) and
...
rm in A(Xsm , Xom)
then
op1
op2
...
opn
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end
The X1, X2 , . . ., Xk are formal parameters. Each opi is one of the following six primitive
operations.
Create subject s; create object o; delete subject s; delete object o; enter r into A(s, o); delete
r from A(s, o). The states of a protection system change on the execution of defined
commands from one state (Oi, Si, Ai) to another (Oj, Sj, Aj).

2.6.2 The Safety Problem
The safety problem is defined in HRU as “the user should be able to tell whether what he
is about to do (give away a right, presumably) can lead to the further leakage of that right
to truly unauthorized subjects” [131]. More specifically, given a protection system and
generic right r, we say that the initial configuration Q0 is unsafe for r (or leaks r) if there is
a configuration Q and a command α such that
–Q is reachable from Q0
– α leaks r from Q
We say Q0 is safe for r if Q0 is not unsafe for r [131].
Two conclusions from HRU are:
1. There is an algorithm which decides whether or not a given mono-operational protection
system and initial configuration is unsafe for a given generic right r.
2. It is undecidable whether a given configuration of a given protection system is safe for
a given generic right.
After the HRU, there has been considerable progress on the safety problem. However, the
HRU conclusion #2 still holds. With most protection systems, the safety problem is still
undecidable. But for a specific protection model, it might be decidable. Researchers
devoted their efforts to find protection models with decidable safety. While at the same
time, these models should have sufficient expressive power to define different policies.
Several well-known protection models with decidable safety has been presented since HRU,
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such as the take-grant protection model [133,135,136,137], Schematic Protection Model
[127,132] and Typed Access Matrix Model [134]. Li and Tripunitara proved that the
security problem in most DAC models is decidable [129,130].

2.7 Network Firewall
The term “firewall” was in use by Lightoler as early as 1764 to describe walls which
separated the parts of a building most likely to have a fire (e.g., a kitchen) from the rest of
a structure [70]. In a computer network, a firewall is a system or a group of systems that
enforces an access control policy on network traffic as it passes through an access point
[71]. A firewall system can be set up to permit or deny the passing of a packet, encrypt,
decrypt or break up and recreate a passing packet, or perform access control on application
level.
The most widely used firewalls can be grouped into three types, ordered by increasing
complexity: packet filtering firewalls, stateful inspection firewalls and application proxies.
Packet filtering firewalls perform access control based on the header of the packets. They
apply certain defined rules on the header to determine whether to forward the packet or
discard the packet. These firewalls are configured to filter both incoming and outgoing
packets. Sometime this type of firewall is called a static firewall.
Stateful inspection firewalls keep track of information about the states of currently
established connections. So on top of checking the header of the packets, the rules of this
type firewalls include information about the connection states.
Application proxies are the most sophisticated firewalls. The previous two types of
firewalls sometimes are called packet filters. In addition to the features of both packet
filtering firewalls and stateful inspection firewalls, application proxies can do application
level checking such as anti-virus scanning and content filtering. Another important feature
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of proxy firewalls is that they break up the packets and recreate them. This feature makes
proxy firewalls more secure. One drawback is that proxy firewalls are slow compared with
the other two types of firewalls.

2.8 Current File System Protection
In UNIX/Linux systems, almost everything is in the form of a file. The types of file include
ordinary files, directories, symbolic links, device files, FIFOs and sockets. The protection
scheme needs to protect not only the system files, but also the user sensitive files. For these
files, we need to protect both confidentiality and integrity.

2.8.1 Basic Security Scheme
The basic security scheme in Unix/Linux has five parts.
1. Login account and password.
They are used to get the users user ID(UID) and group ID(GID), which would be used later
to decide whether the user can access certain files. The account information is saved in a
password file and the password is saved after encryption.
2. Permission bits, setuid and setgid bits.
The permission bits on each file defines what rights the owner, users in the same group and
all the other users have over this file. The permission sets are set by the root and the owner.
Setuid and setgid enable a user to temporarily run an executable with the permissions of
the executable’s owner or group.
3. The super user.

Also known as the root, the super user has full permissions to access all files on the system.
That is, the super user can execute any file that has any of its “execute” permissions turned
on, and can access, read, modify or delete any file and any directory. The super user can
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change the permissions on any file too. One major type of attacks is to get the power of the
super user.
4. Encryption and decryption.
Encryption and decryption are used for authentication and authorization. We can encrypt
files and communications using different encryption and decryption algorithms. The
password verification also uses encryption. For instance, GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) is
free software used to encrypt and decrypt files together with a password for the Linux
operating system.
5. Chroot jail.
When the “chroot” system call is called, the calling process’s root directory is modified
and reset, and any future system calls issued by the process will see that new specified
directory as the file system root. This makes it impossible to access files and binaries
outside the tree rooted on the new root directory. But there are two problems with “chroot”
jail. One is that the process will need various files and program to do some operation. So
we need to set up some support environment. The other is that it is possible that the user
can break out from the jail.

2.8.2 Unix/Linux Security Modules and Extensions
On top of the basic file system protection scheme, there are some security extensions or
security services that are supported in UNIX/Linux system. Some UNIX/Linux systems
might also support one or a combination of ACL, Capabilities, RBAC and DTE. We briefly
explain each of them in chapter 3. Below are some well- known security extensions and
enhanced access control implementations.
1. Linux Capabilities. Linux Capabilities is started as an effort to limit the privileges of a
process when it runs with the privileges of the super user. The privileges associated with
the super user are broken into distinct units, these are called capabilities. Each capability is
just a bit in a bitmap which is either set or unset. A process has three sets of bitmaps called
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the inheritable set, permitted set, and effective set. When a process tries to do a privileged
operation, the operating system will check the appropriate bit in the effective set of the
process to determine if the access should be allowed. The permitted set defines the
capabilities the process might have in both effective set and inheritance set. The inheritable
set defines the capabilities of the current process that should be inherited by the program
executed by the current process. For instance, if the current process A executed program
B, then the process of B will inherit the inheritable set of the capabilities of A.
2. Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux). SELinux was originally a development project
from the National Security Agency (NSA), Secure Computing Corporation (SCC) and
others. Built on LSM framework, SELinux supports a set of access control policies, such
as MAC, DTE and RBAC. SELinux is now a standard component of non-commercial
distributions of Linux, such as Fedora, Debian GNU/Linux, Gentoo Linux etc.
3. Domain and Type Enforcement (DTE) Linux. Domain and Type Enforcement for Linux
is implemented as a kernel (v2.3.28) [38] patch. Other than the patch, DTE is also
supported by SELinux.
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Chapter 3
Related Work
The firewall model for file system protection is novel, but a lot of research effort has been
devoted to fine-grained access control models or enhance the current access control scheme
in Unix/Linux systems. We will describe these research works and research in file system
redirection which we implement in our firewall model.

3.1 Linux Security Module
The Linux security module (LSM) [28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34] framework provides a general
framework to support access control modules which might implement an access control
model, such as DTE, RBAC, ACL or Capabilities. LSM includes security hooks in the
kernel and the security modules which are loaded in the kernel. The so-called security
hooks are just lines of code calling functions in the security module, and typically are not
lengthy. These hooks can be task hooks, program loading hooks, file system hooks, IPC
hooks, network hooks and other hooks.
When there is an access request, the system first does the normal DAC check. Then it turns
to the security modules, through the security hooks, to check whether the request should
be granted or denied. Then control turns back to the system. Under LSM, the security
modules, which implement security policies, can be loaded into the kernel as kernel
modules. Thus, to apply a different security policy, we just need to load a different security
module. If no security modules are loaded, no extra access control is applied.
Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) is built on LSM and it is the most popular security
extension so far for Linux. Since it is built on LSM, it can support different security policies.
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SELinux is a bundle of kernel modules and user-space configuration tools which
implement three different types of MAC [37]: Type Enforcement (TE), Role-Based Access
Controls (RBACs) and Multi-Level Security (MLS), which defines access controls against
objects based on data classification (sensitivity). SELinux was originally a development
project from the National Security Agency (NSA) and it is an implementation of the Flask
operating system security architecture. Flask focuses on the concept of least privilege,
which gives a process exactly the rights it needs to perform its given task. NSA integrated
SELinux into the Linux kernel using the Linux Security Modules (LSM) framework. The
SELinux code was integrated upstream to the 2.6.x kernel in 2003.
AppArmor (Application Armor) is another set of security modules built on LSM from
Novell. It is a parallel product to SELinux and is also a MAC model. To protect the
operating system and applications from both known and unknown vulnerabilities,
AppArmor uses application behavior enforcement. AppArmor is built on the assumption
that the single biggest attack vector on most systems is application vulnerabilities. If the
applications behavior is restricted, the behavior of any attacker who succeeds in exploiting
some vulnerability in that application also will be restricted [37]. In AppArmor, each
program is associated with a security profile. AppArmor then uses security profiles to
restrict the capabilities of the program. AppArmor pre-builds profiles for popular
operating-system services and common applications, including Web, e-mail and remotelogin applications. AppArmor is also integrated into the LSM module for the Linux 2.6
kernel.

3.2 Rule-Set Based Access Control
Rule-set based access control (RSBAC) [68, 69] is an open source security extension based
on the Generalized Framework for Access Control (GFAC) by Abrams and LaPadula.
RSBAC is a kernel based access control scheme, and can be configured with different
security policies. In the RSBAC system, the access control system of the Linux kernel has
three parts, the AEF (access enforcement facility) component, the ADF (access control
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decision facility) component and the ACI (Access control information) module. Access
requests first go through AEF and AEF will gather information on the requests and send
the access requests together with that information to ADF. ACI is responsible to collect
information on the security attributes of processes, of users and of all resources that are
needed. ADF is the part that implements different security policies, so after AEF sends the
access requests to ADF, ADF will check the policy rules together with information
obtained from ACI, then make a final decision and send the decision back to AEF. AEF is
policy independent, while ADF and ACI are policy dependent. The rules are expressed
with a language more like a programming language rather than mathematical notations.
Some security policies are implemented in ADF, including MAC and ACL.

3.3 Attribute Based Access Control
Attribute based access control (ABAC) [77, 78, 79] started in systems where the number
of users is huge and the users are dynamic, such as Internet. In these systems, it is hard to
use user identity to meditate the access control. Instead, the attributes of the users are used
for the users to gain access to certain resources. ABAC is used in RBAC to assign the users
to roles according to the attributes of the users [78]. ABAC is extended to the attribute
based access matrix model in [79]. In this model, each subject with its attributes is
associated with a row and each object with its attributes is associated with a column. Each
cell in the matrix is the access rights the subject have over the object. From the paper, the
attributes of the subjects look like unchanged since the time of creation.

3.4 Sandboxing
Besides the previous security extensions and models, Sandboxing is another technique that
is related to our research. Sandboxing is a technique to use a sandbox, which is a confined
restricted environment, to execute an un-trusted program. Even if the un-trusted program
is infected, the harm that can be done is localized in the sandbox. The program should
never be able to access anything that is outside of the sandbox. To set up a sandbox,
required files or services must be included in the sandbox. This, however, is not a trivial
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task. The “chroot jail” in UNIX is one of the sandboxing applications. Sandboxing can
provide decent security, but comes with the cost that some software could not be executed
outside of the sandbox even when harmless. A related technique is a honeypot, which is
the opposite of a sandbox. A honeypot is a closely monitored computing resource that we
want to be probed, attacked or compromised [50]. It is a technology to gather information
about attacks.

3.5 Redirecting FileSystem
The Redirecting File System (RedirFS) [48, 49] is built in the virtual file system (VFS)
layer and can be seen as a new layer between the original VFS and the file system drivers.
It is implemented as an out-of-kernel module for Linux 2.6. The RedirFS by itself does not
provide any additional functionality. If it is loaded into the Linux kernel, it just occupies
some memory space and does practically nothing. The RedirFS is intended to be used by
the so-called filter which is a Linux kernel module (LKM) that uses the RedirFS framework.
Each filter can add some useful functionality to the existing file systems, like transparent
compression, transparent encryption, merging contents of several directories into one,
allowing writing to a read-only media and others. While the RedirFS is located in the VFS
layer, filters can be used generally in all file systems (e.g. ext2, nfs, proc) [48, 49].

3.6 Other Proposals
There are other great ideas about how to improve the access control in Unix/Linux systems.
Marie and Bruce [23] proposed to provide access control to objects in object-oriented
software. Their proposal used protection domains and user authentications to protect the
objects by restricting which methods a user can operate. An object instance can reside in a
secure domain and the methods that operate on that object can only be applied if the user
invoking those methods has the appropriate authority to do so [23]. This idea is very similar
to RBAC. The methods are similar to the concept of transactions in RBAC. If a user does
not have permission to access the methods, the user cannot access the objects. The only
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difference is that a user has to have access to the objects as well in this model. In this model,
a type controller table is used to specify which user has the access right to certain methods.
But this only improves the security over object-oriented software, not on the whole file
system.
Trent Jaeger and his colleagues propose using inter-process communication (IPC)
redirection [26] to enforce access control policies for micro-kernel systems. A redirection
controller is needed perform the access control checks and to decide whether the current
IPC communication is allowed. The redirection is used to redirect the IPC communication.
Processes are grouped into redirection sets, and each set has its own chief and all the
redirections happen between the chiefs. The chief is responsible to check on access and
decide whether to forward the IPC to the right process.
Access control based on execution history [20, 25] is another type of access control model.
Whether the current access request is granted depends on the execution history of the
current subject. An execution monitor is required to keep track of the history of accesses
the subject has made. Then it grants or denies the next access request based on the recorded
history. With different policies, different data has to be kept. This method can be used to
implement certain policies, such as the Chinese Wall policy and low-water-mark policy.
A stack based model is also used for general access control policies. The idea is that the
access right that the current piece of code has is the intersection of all the static permissions
of pieces of code on the stack. If A calls B, then when B executes, it only have the rights
shared by both A and B. This is used widely in Java Virtual Machines (JVM) and Common
Language Runtime (CLR).CLR is a counterpart of JVM in Windows2000 and WindowsXP.
Christian Payne [47] proposed cryptographic access control architecture, called the vaults
security model, to limit the power of root. The vaults security model has user vaults for
users and system vaults for the kernel and administrator. User vaults are for sensitive data
and tickets that are used to access cryptographically protected files, so whether a user could
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access a certain file depends on whether the user has a ticket for that specific file. The
vaults security model is a lock-and-key model. A basic public key infrastructure is used in
this model. A highly privileged user, called the prime user, is still needed to perform some
administrative work. But unlike the root in the traditional systems, the prime user privileges
are only for limited tasks. No other system services are run with the privileges of the prime
user. The prime user’s privileges are not determined by identity, but are determined by the
possession of special tickets.
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Chapter 4
File System Firewall Model
We begin this section with the motivation and the definitions of the firewall model and its
features. Then we show a formal definition of file system firewall model.

4.1 Motivation
4.1.1 Accommodate Complicated Access Control Requirements
In most access control systems, access decisions are made based on one of the credentials
of subjects, such as identity of the user (UID) in DAC, or domain type in DTE. With access
control systems applying widely to different information systems, these systems are found
inadequate to manage more complex and flexible access control requirements. For example,
a health care system may need the affiliation of user accounts, the time of day, and the
location of the current computer in the network to decide whether the access requests
should be granted.
In any access control system access control decisions are made based on the certain system
state(s). The user ID, process domain or account role is all one of the states of subjects in
the whole system state. The whole system state that is relevant to access control may
include certain states of subjects, objects and system environment. More complex access
control requirements need more states to more closely define. One example access control
policy may be that only myApp can access the target file F, when size of F is below 9M,
and the accessing time is between 9am to 5pm. Under other conditions, the access requests
will be denied. When we include the relevant attributes of subjects, objects and
environment in the access control systems, access control policies can be specified on one,
two or any subset of these attributes. The access control policies are defined on a multiple26

dimension space rather than a single attribute. Including attributes of subjects, objects and
environment in the access control systems brings us another flexibility, that is, it makes it
possible to associate different access control policies with different objects. An application
configuration file may only be modified by its own application, that is, the process subject.
A backup program may only be started by certain account on certain time period. A file
may not be read when its size changed. These access control requirements are on a different
subset of the attributes of the system states.

4.1.2 Integrity Protection of the File System
Early security models are for the military systems, so the confidentiality was the center of
the security protection. In the commercial world and the civil world, the integrity of the
data can be more important than the confidentiality of the data. We want the protection
model to protect not only the confidentiality of the system, but also the integrity of the
system. In computer security, there are three goals of integrity protection [75]: prevent
unauthorized modifications, maintain internal and external consistency, and prevent
authorized but improper modifications.
The traditional UNIX access control scheme can provide some degree of integrity
protection of the objects in that only authorized subjects can access the objects, but it could
not protect the objects from improper modifications caused either by attackers or by human
errors. We have to trust the authorized users for operating on the objects properly. For
example, if a user is authorized to modify certain files, the user will have write access to
these files. We will have to trust the user to modify the data correctly, not to destroy the
files. The internal and external consistency is not supported either. To achieve the
consistency, application level programs have to be used.
The enhanced access control models still do not provide direct integrity protection to
prevent improper modifications and inconsistency. In Capabilities, the privileges of the
root are partitioned to make sure a certain process can only run with a part of the root
privileges. The goal is to confine the root privileges, so no integrity control is added. In
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DTE, some integrity protection is provided indirectly by making sure subjects in certain
domains can only access the objects in specified types. So only authorized subjects can
operate on specified objects.
With RBAC, a user is associated with roles which decide whether the user can access
certain objects. It still focuses on “only authorized user can operate on specified objects”.
RBAC can provide internal and external consistency protection, but at the application level,
not system level. We just have to trust users or processes to perform authorized and proper
modifications. But users can make mistakes and the programs can have bugs and can be
exploited by attackers. In these models, the integrity control could not meet the goals of
integrity protection.
There are actually some security models that focus on integrity protection. Two wellknown integrity models are Biba model and Clark-Wilson model. Biba works better in
systems where subjects and objects have clear integrity levels. Clark-Wilson model is an
application level model. Both do not quite fit general UNIX systems. We include these two
models in this section to make our discussion about integrity complete.
Biba model is a multiple-level security model. In Biba model, subjects and objects have
strict integrity levels. Subjects cannot read objects with lower integrity level, cannot write
to objects with higher integrity level, and cannot execute another subject with higher
integrity level. Information only flows one way. Biba model focuses on protect data from
being contaminated. Therefore, Biba model only addresses the first goal of integrity
protection, that is, to prevent unauthorized modification.
Clark-Wilson model [76] groups the objects into Unconstrained Data Items (UDIs) and
Constrained Data Items (CDIs). CDIs are data that subject to integrity control, while UDIs
are not. Two kinds of procedures are defined. One is Integrity Verification Procedure (IVP),
which is used to test the integrity constraints on CDIs. The other is Transformation
procedures (TP), which changes CDI sets of the system from one valid state to another.
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IVP is executed before and after the execution of a TP to conform that the system is in
valid states. A user cannot access CDIs directly. It can only have execution right on the
associated TPs, which can operate on the CDI sets. Clark-Wilson model defines 5
certification rules and 4 enforcement rules to ensure the integrity of data items. In this
model, all the three goals of integrity protection are provided.
Clark-Wilson model addresses the security requirements of commercial applications such
as bank systems, hospital systems and other computer systems where all the data are stored
in databases and users can only access the data through well-defined transactions. In this
model, users do not have access to the data. They just have execution access to certain
transactions. Other than using these transactions, users can not access any of the data. In
UNIX, it is the user that has access rights to the objects. A program will inherit the access
rights from the user who executes the program. Polk [80] describes an approximation of
Clark-Wilson model under UNIX system, in which setuid programs are used to bypass this
problem. But by doing so, too many setuid programs will be in the system. It comes with
other problems as well [1], so it is not practical.
There are other issues with Clark-Wilson model under the UNIX system. TPs are executed
serially, rather than several at once [76]. IVP is executed before and after the execution of
a TP to conform that the system is in valid states. In UNIX, to make sure processes run
serially and maintain the data consistency, extra mechanisms are needed. Since the root
can modify the Clark-Wilson triples (user, TP, CDI set), and have execution rights to any
TP, separation of duty is hard to achieve.
In the firewall model, integrity protection will include preventing improper modifications
which are not provided by any other access control models under UNIX systems. The
improper modification might be caused by attacks or human error. For example, an attacker
might try to overwrite important configuration files to disable the system. An administrator
might add a user account to the password file without specifying the right values by mistake.
These improper modification to the objects could not be detected by other models under
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UNIX systems. Certain specified integrity constraints will be applied by the firewall model
to control how certain files can be modified.

4.1.3 Ease of Administration
We want the protection model to be easy to use for the administrators. In any security
systems, the most important aspect is the people. A security model should be friendly to
the administrators, otherwise people will have a hard time to adopt it and will eventually
stop using it. Sometimes security only appears important to the users after a major
successful attack. When nothing happens, a security department does not get as much
attention as other departments. It is important that a security model is easy to understand,
set up and maintain for administrators.
Firewall model works in the way that administrators are familiar with. Administrators have
lots of experience with network firewall. They understand how the network traffic and
filters work. They can set up, configure and maintain the firewall with ease. File system
firewall model shares the same abstractions with network firewall. File system firewall is
an access control model that enforces access control policies to the file systems. Just like a
network firewall enforces access control policies between two or more networks. Access
requests to files can be allowed and denied. Network traffic can be permitted passing or
blocked. The integrity control we discussed earlier that allow only certain modifications to
the files is like the content filtering in network firewall. Same as the network firewall, to
use the firewall model, they need to set up the configuration on filter rules. In Firewall
model, filter rules are specified over the object. This is similar to the ACL model, where
each object is associated with an access control list. ACL has been around and supported
in certain UNIX systems, so it is not something new to the administrators. All in all,
administrators do not need to think differently and we expect them to be comfortable using
the file system firewall.
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4.1.4 MAC for Specified Subjects and Objects
Many attacks follow the same pattern: exploit some vulnerability to make a running process
execute the malicious code of the attacker. With DAC, the attackers can have all the access
rights the running process has. The situation gets worse with the super user, setuid and
setgid mechanisms. Once the attacker gets a process running with root privilege to execute
malicious code, severe damage can be done to the system. This is why the recent access
control models try to confine the power of the super user. With MAC over DAC, the access
rights are not only at the discretion of the owner or super user, but also are constricted by
specified security policies. So we can limit the damage of these attacks.
One goal of most existing security models in UNIX system is to confine the super power
of the root and provide MAC control over DAC. POSIX Capabilities model is such a model.
It splits the privileges of root into capabilities that certain processes have. Even if the root
starts a certain process, the process can only perform operations in the effective set of its
defined capabilities. DTE confines the root by making many root programs be executed in
restrictive domains that only allow access appropriate to each program’s assigned
responsibilities [6].
To provide the MAC protection over DAC, the current access control models tag all the
subjects and all the objects with security labels and then specify the policies according to
these tags and labels. We want to protect sensitive data. However, we have to tag
everything in the system. This is a waste of time and resource especially when we take into
account that most of the time the sensitive data are only a very small portion of the system.
We want our security protection model to support MAC over DAC for only specified
processes and files, such as system processes and files and sensitive user data. Security is
always a trade-off. We want our model to be flexible for the trade-off. That is, our model
can be set up to provide protection for all the subjects and objects in the system, or only
sensitive system or user processes and files. By supporting MAC over DAC for only
specified subjects and objects, we can get rid of the unnecessary security operations and
improve the performance of security systems.
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4.1.5 Redirection
In network firewall, packages can be forwarded to different networks. We borrow this idea
from network firewall and include it in the file system firewall. Its parallel operation in the
file system firewall model is redirection. If an access request is illegal, instead of just
denying the access, we can redirect the access request for one object to another phony
object with a certain degree of transparency. With redirection, we can monitor, track and
study the attacks without any harm to the system. At the same time, attackers get false
feedback from the system. So redirection can be used to set up a honeypot. This is a unique
feature that we have not found in any other access control models.

4.1.6 Flexibility
One of the features that most current access control models lack is flexibility. If we want
to allow permission only for a short period of time, or only under certain conditions, in
current security models, there is no direct and straightforward way to make this happen.
We include the attributes to form propositions to make this fairly easy in the firewall model.
In package filtering firewall, whether a package can pass the firewall or be blocked is
decided by checking the header of the packages. If certain value or value combination
matches the filter rule, the appropriate action will be taken, that is, to forward or to block.
The file system firewall works the same way: according to the values of the attributes, the
access request might be allowed or denied. Another type of flexibility the firewall model
can offer is the run-time update of the filter rules, just like the network firewall. This feature
is not discussed explicitly in most of the current security models. Since each filter rule is
for one object only. Changing this particular rule does not affect any other rules. With
appropriate implementation, run-time update of the filter rules can be supported.

4.2 The Definitions of Firewall Model
The file system firewall model is an access control model. Access control is one of the
fundamental problems besides authentication and authorization in file system security. It
enforces security policies, mediates access requests to decide whether the access requests
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should be granted or denied. It acts as a security layer on top of the current protection
scheme. Any access request sent to the file system has to go through the firewall first. It is
an adoption of the familiar network firewall protection model, used to control the data that
flows between networked computers, toward file system protection. This model supports
decisions of access control based on a set of filter rules on attributes related to access
requests: attributes of the subjects, the system and the objects. Access control policies are
expressed in a rule set using predicates of attributes. Each rule is specified over an object
of access requests. We call the rules filter rules just like in the network firewall. The
firewall either pass the access requests to the file system (allowing access or redirection)
or drop them (deny access) according to matched filter rules.

4.2.1 File System Firewall (FSF)
File system firewall (FSF) is an access control system we have developed on Unix/Linux
systems that decides whether an access request to an object on file system should be granted,
denied or redirected based on a set of filter rules on attributes. We name the system file
system firewall because of the similarity it shares with a network firewall. A computer
network firewall enforces an access control policies on network traffic as it passes through
an access point [71] and manages the incoming and outgoing network traffic by analyzing
the data packets and decides whether they should be allowed through, discarded, or
forwarded based on a rule set [119].
The objects or targets of access requests are normal files on Unix/Linux system: regular
files, directories, symbolic links, hard links, named pipes, sockets, and devices. The
attributes could be any attributes on subject, object or the system, such as the DTE domain
of the subject, size of the target file, or time of day. FSF can be used as an extra layer of
protection on top of current access control systems.
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4.2.2 Filter Rules
Filter rules are used to specify access control policies. The format of filter rules is listed
below. In UNIX-like file systems, a file is identified by a pair of (inode number, partition
number). In the filter rules of FSF, the pair of (inode number, partition number) is used to
identify an object.
FR = (Object, Access type, Predicates, Action, Action parameter) where
Object is the target of the access request;
Access Type is a set of the access request type, such as read, write, execute and others,
Predicates is the conjunction of a set of predicates defined on the attributes of the request
subject, object and the current system;
Action is the action to take when the predicates are all true. It could be “redirect”, or “allow”,
“deny”, or any other action; and
Action Parameter defines parameters that might be required to perform the indicated action.
An example only_allow filter rule is:
FR1 = ((inoS1, partS1), {read}, {program = App, hour >9, hour <17}, only_allow, {}).
This rule defines that only program App can read the file identified by {inoS1, partS1}
during 9am-5pm. Any other attempt of reading the object by process that is not App or not
during work hours will be denied.
An example redirection filter rule is:
FR2 = ((inoS2, partS2), {}, {fileSize > 100M}, redirect, {(inoD, partD)}).
The rule specifies that if the size of target file is more than 100M, then an access request
to the file with inode inoS1 in partition partS1 will be redirected to the file with inode
inoD in partition partD.
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4.2.3 Three Types of Filter Rules
So far, we defined three types of filter rules according to the action type: allow, deny and
redirect. Allow rules specify situations under which the access requests should be allowed.
Deny rules define situations that access requests should be denied. On one object, either
allow rules or deny rules may be defined, but not both. If allow rules are defined, then by
default, any access request should be denied unless the access request matches any of these
allow rules. Similarly, if deny rules are defined, then by default the access requests should
be granted.
Redirection is an extra feature of FSF comparing with other access control systems. Instead
of merely denying an illegal access request, FSF redirects the access request to another
node in the file system. The redirection is transparent to users. This can be used to study
and analyze illegal access attempts.

4.3 Features and Usage
4.3.1 MAC Control
Many attacks follow the same pattern: exploit some vulnerability to make a running process
executing the malicious code of the attackers. With DAC, once the attackers attack a
process running with root privilege to execute malicious code, severe damage can be done
to the system. This is the reason that one of the goals of most security extensions on
Linux/Unix system is to confine the unlimited powder of root account by providing MAC
control. FSF is a MAC model. Whether an access request will pass the firewall is decided
by the loaded filter rules. Root account does not have all the privileges as in a traditional
access control scheme.

4.3.2 Conditional Access Control with Multiple Attributes
Most access control systems are based on the value of a single attribute, such as user
identity or process domain, to make access control decisions. FSF extends this single
attribute to multiple attributes with conditions. This puts access control into a system
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scenario, and gives administrators more flexibility in dealing with access control
requirements more complicated than just the identity of the account. The definition of the
system scenario is defined with predicates on attributes in FSF. With a single attribute
system, the security policies can be seen defined on the value of attribute as an equality
operation. For example, when UID=Andy, appropriate permissions are defined for a certain
target. Besides the equality operation, FSF adds “>”, “<”, “!=” to the definition of filter
rules. The attributes can be any attributes in the system, the attributes on the subject or
process, the attributes on the object or target resource, and the attributes on the system.

4.3.3 Ease of Adoption and Administration
People are the more important part of an access control systems. No matter how powerful
and access control system is, it is useless if no one wants to use it. Adoption to a new access
control system is intimidating by its nature. On top of traditional DAC system, many access
control systems are recently designed and deployed on Linux/Unix systems. However,
despite their new advanced features, some of them are not used as often as expected. Some
systems are complex to set up. Other systems are complicated to maintain. The adoptions
to these systems have been slow. In FSF, the specification of filter rules is similar to the
specification of network packet filters. Both basically include three parts: target of this
filter rule, a set of propositions, and an action. Administrators are familiar with network
packet filters, which would make the adoption of FSF not as intimidating as some other
access control systems. Similar to ACLs, the filter rules are defined on objects with
pathnames, which is another aspect administrators have known and might have used.
Another advantage of FSF is that it does not have to be defined and setup once and for the
whole system before use. It only requires filter rules defined on involved targets.

4.3.4 Redirection
In network firewall, packages can be forwarded to different networks. This idea is applied
to the file system firewall as redirection. If an access request is illegal, instead just being
denied, it can be redirected to another phony object with certain degree of transparency.
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This feature can be used in monitoring, tracking and studying the attacks without any harm
to the system. At the same time, attackers get false feedback from the system.

4.3.5 Usage
Like any other access control systems, FSF can be used alone to enforce access control
policies. The access control policies are specified on resources. The overall FSF is open
authentication. That is, if there are no filter rules defined on a specific resources, the access
requests are granted by default. However, it can be open or close authentication when there
are filter rules defined on a resource. If allow rules are defined, it is close authentication.
Only those access requests that pass the allow rules have access. If deny rules are defined,
then it is open authentication again.
FSF can cooperate with other access control systems, and serve as an extra layer of
protection on top of existing access control systems. Since it is open authentication,
administrators only need to specify filter rules on needed resources.
FSF can be used to simulate or implement other access control systems by using the right
attributes. For example, when we choose the user ID as the only cared attribute, we can
implement ACL and Capabilities. When we choose domain of the processes as the cared
attribute, we can simulate DTE model. Certain extra operations may be needed to collect
data on the involved attributes for some access control systems, but the FSF framework
remains the same.

4.4 The Operational Specifications of the Firewall Model
We define our firewall model formally in the following operational specifications. We
will describe some definitions, then define the operations of the firewall model.

4.4.1 Definitions of Basic Components
The definitions of basic components are listed below.
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Definition 1: Request Attributes.
We define request attribute RA to be a set of attributes and their associated values related
to one specific access request. These attributes could be the attributes about the subject, the
object of the access request and the system environment. A request attribute is used to
check whether or not to apply certain filter rules. We use an attribute name and its value
pair to describe one element of the request attribute.
RA = {(ni, vi): ni is the name of an attribute, vi is the value of ni}.
Some example system attributes are listed below:
UID: User ID.
GID: User’s group ID.
Name (program name): The name of the process that sends the access request.
Time (access time): The time when the access request is sent.
Owner: The resource owner, the owner of the target file.
Bowner: The owner of the binary.
EUID: Effective user ID.
EGID: Effective group ID.
Size: The size of the object.
For instance, one specific request attribute can be:
RA attr = {(UID, 100), (GID, 100), (Name, vim), (Time, 2000)}.
In this example the access request has four attributes: the user ID of the request is 100, the
user group ID is 100, the program name of the current process is “vim”, and the access
time is 8pm.
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Definition 2: Access Type.
An access request type AT is a set of all possible access rights a subject might have over
an object. For instance, it can be a subset of {read, write, execute, create, delete}, such as:
AT = {read, write, execute, create, delete}.
It means that in the current system, all the access rights a subject can have over an object
are read, write, execute, create or delete.
Definition 3: Access Request.
An access request AR is a sequence of values that defines the access request. We need all
the information in the access request to decide whether the access request is granted, denied
or redirected. A general form is defined as (object, access type, request attribute), where
object is the target object of the access request, access type is a set of access request type,
access type  كT, and request attribute is a request attribute.
One simple example is:
AR ar = (/etc/passwd, {read}, {(UID, 100), (GID, 200), (NAME, vi)}).
This means there is this access request with 100 as UID and 200 as GID is trying to use the
program vi to read the file “/etc/passwd”.
Definition 4: Attribute Predicate.
We define P(n) to be the predicate of the attribute with the name n in the request attribute.
We use theses predicates to build the filter rules. For example, P(UID) is the predicate on
UID, such
As
P(UID) : UID > 100.
We define PS to be a predicate set:
PS = {P(n)|n is the name of an attribute}.
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Definition 5: Filter Rule.
A filter rule R is a sequence of values. A general form applies to each filter rule only with
different values for the elements in the sequence. The filter rules specify the security
policies. Each filter rule has a specified access request object file name, an access type, a
set of predicates, an action, and the parameters of the action. If the access request matches
the rule, then the action defined in this filter rule will follow. All filter rules have the same
form:
(object, access type, predicate, action, action parameter) where
object is the object file of the rule,
access type is a set of the access request type, such as read,write,
predicate is a set of predicates defined on the request attributes,
action is the action we take if the predicates are all true. It could be “redirect”, or
“grant”/“deny,
action parameter defines parameters the action might need.
One example could be:
R rule = (/etc/passwd, {read}, {UID! = 0}, redirect, {/phony/ect/passwd}).
In this example, the policy is that if the UID is not 0, then we redirect the read access
request to the file “/phony/ect/passwd”.
Let N be the total number of rules, and all filter rules in a system is a set:
F = {(oi, ati, PSi, ai, api)|0 < i N}.

4.4.2 Operational Specifications
We define three types of operations of the firewall model: redirection, grant or deny access
and content filtering. In network firewall, similar operations are forward a package, pass
or drop a package and content filtering accordingly. These operations correspond to the
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three types of filter rules in our firewall model: redirection rules, access rules and content
filtering rules.
Operation: Redirection.
Description: For an access request, if the object file (the object) of the access request
matches the object in a filter rule, all the predicates are evaluated to be true and the action
of the rule is “redirect”, then the access request is redirected to another file (the target)
specified in the action parameter of the rule.
Let the access request be AR ar = (o, at, v) , N be the total number of rules, all filter rules
be
F = {(oi, ati, PSi, ai, api)|0 < i  N} and |PSi| = Ci . If דk, so that 0 < k  N, o = ok , at א
ati,
ak = redirect, and P(n1)^P(n2)^· · ·^P(nCi) = True, where each of n1, n2, · · · nCi is the
name of an attribute in v of the access request ar, then the access to file o is redirected to
the file target apk.
Operation: Grant/Deny Access.
Description: This is the basic access control rule. Only when all the predicates are evaluated
to be true, the access request is granted/denied as specified in the rule.
Let the access request be AR ar = (o, at, v), N be the number of rules, all filter rules be
F = {(oi, ati, Pi, ai, api), 0 < i  N } and |PSi| = Ci. If דk, o = ok , at  אati, ak = grant||deny,
apk
is empty, and P(n1) ^P(n2)^ · · · ^P(nCi) = True, where each of n1, n2, · · · nCi is the name
of one attribute in v of the access request ar, then the access to file o is granted or denied
as specified in ak.
Operation: Content Filtering.
Description: The target file of the current access request can be modified only in a specified
manner.
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This operation is used to provide integrity protection to the file system.
Let the access request be AR ar = (o, at, v), N be the number of rules, all filter rules be
F = {(oi, ati, Pi, ai, api), 0 < i  N } and |PSi| = Ci . If דk, o = ok , at = write, ak = Content,
apk is not empty, and P(n1) ^ P(n2) ^ · · · ^ P(nCi) = True, where each of n1, n2, · · · nCi
is the name of one attribute in v of the access request ar, then the file can only be modified
as specified in apk. Otherwise, no change is allowed.
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Chapter 5
Prototype Implementation and Performance Test
In this chapter we discuss the possible approaches to implement the prototype of FSF and
show the reasons of our approach. Then we explain our implementation and give the results
of performance test.

5.1 Possible Approaches
We study the existing frameworks that could be used to implement our firewall model. The
two most plausible approaches are stackable file systems and LSM. Unfortunately, we
cannot build our firewall model using either of these frameworks. We will examine these
two frameworks and show why this is the case.

5.1.1 Stackable File System
A stackable file system [42, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57] or stackable layers file system is a
file system that is constructed from a number of independently developed layers. Each
layer is bounded by a symmetric interface, meaning the interface is syntactically identical
above and below [51]. Layers combine in stacks, either linear or tree shaped collections.
Each layer is built on the functionality of those beneath it. The goal of stackable file system
is to simplify the process of file system development by providing an extensible file system
interface [57]. Each layer has its own page cache, inode and dentry caches.
Stackable file systems have some really good features, such as extensibility and flexibility.
The best feature of the stackable file system is its extensibility. New services can be added
into the stackable file system architecture as another layer. More importantly, each layer
can be provided by different parties because of the symmetric interfaces defined in the
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stackable file system. No kernel changes are needed when another layer is added. The
stackable file system does need some kernel support, but once it is done, adding other layers
would not require any more kernel changes.
Another great feature is flexibility. The symmetric interface defined in the stackable file
systems makes the order of the layers irrelevant. This means a layer can be placed either
on top or below another layer, and the functionality provided by all these layers would not
change. Adding or removing a layer would not affect other layers.
But these great features come with a price. Below are some issues with the stackable file
system. The biggest issue is the cache coherence problem. It includes both data coherence
and meta-data coherence [55]. The data pages, the vnodes and dentries are cached at each
layer, so the independent changes in different layers might cause incoherence problems
between different layers. Extra mechanisms are needed to make sure they are consistent.
Also with caching at each layer, additional overhead is incurred to deal with caching in
each layer and cache consistency between layers. Even though we could add as many layers
as we need with the infrastructure, the overhead caused by making the caches consistent
would be growing with more layers and would hinder the performance.
A template wrapper file system - Wrapfs [52, 53, 54, 57] is introduced to simplify the
process to add an extra layer to the Linux kernel. Wrapfs takes care of interfacing with the
rest of the kernel; it provides the developer with simple hooks to modify or inspect file data,
file names, and file attributes [54]. It provides interfaces with both VFS layer and the lower
real file systems layer. Stackable file systems can be written from Wrapfs. So a security
layer can be added into the operating system by adding and modifying codes from Wrapfs.
However, the firewall functionality does not easily layer with Wrapfs. The interface
provided by Wrapfs sits above the on-disk file system, just below the VFS. The Wrapfs
file system uses the inode and dentry objects passed down from VFS. If an operation is
redirected, then the inode number for the target file will be determined in a file system
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layer beneath the VFS; the VFS will use the object file. Hence, the VFS layer and the
firewall layer will have different inode and dentry for this target file. This introduces an
inconsistency that requires significant additional overhead to address. So stackable file
system is not a good choice for our model.

5.1.2 Linux Security Module (LSM)
LSM [28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34] is another possible way we could use to build our firewall
system. LSM is designed to provide support for access control that supplements the
traditional UNIX controls. The LSM framework contains hooks into the kernel so that an
access control decision can be made by a module loaded onto the kernel. The LSM will
call the appropriate module components in order to make access control decisions. To use
LSM, one just needs to implement the security module and call the security service using
the appropriate hooks.
Unfortunately LSM the LSM framework cannot support the redirection function. The LSM
can only support yes or no decisions to grant or deny an access request. However, for
redirection, we must change the inode of the current access request. Additionally, the
security hooks in LSM support evaluation after the traditional UNIX access control
evaluation. Efficient redirection should happen right after identification of the inode of the
object file. At this point, the inode and dentry of the object are replaced with the inode and
dentry of the target; then it is not necessary to modify each individual function (that
requires the inode and dentry of an object file) in the kernel in order to do the redirection.
The translation from object to target inode and dentry is done before the traditional UNIX
checks. Since the LSM security check is after the traditional UNIX checks, it is less
efficient to use the LSM.

5.2 Components
FSF has basically three components: filter unit and filter rule database in kernel, and filter
rule management to load filter rules into database or remove filter rules from the database.
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The filter unit and the filter rule database are in the kernel. The filter unit is responsible of
checking the filter rule database, collecting data on appropriate attributes, and get an action
to an access request at an accessing point.
In addition to the two components that reside in the kernel, FSF requires filter rules
management program that administrators can use load new filter rules into the kernel or
remove filter rules from the kernel.

5.3 Design Concern
A protection model in UNIX systems not only needs to provide the protection to the file
system, but also needs to be practical. We want the prototype to have the following
properties.
One property is that the prototype should show decent performance. The overhead caused
by the firewall model should be reasonable.
The other property is that the prototype should make as few changes to the kernel as
possible. The firewall model has to be built into the kernel. This way the performance will
be better, since we avoid the frequent context switching between kernel space and user
space during the access control process. Another advantage is that it cannot be bypassed.
Less changes makes it easy to incorporate the model into the different versions of the kernel
and makes it simple to debug and maintain the system.

5.4 The Prototype of the Firewall Model
The firewall model is implemented in the VFS layer of the Linux kernel. The
implementation supports ordinary, directory, symbolic link, named pipe and socket file
types. The firewall can additionally support redirection across file systems. The goal for
the current version of prototype was to test the chosen implementation structure and to
determine whether or not performance is acceptable. Redirection is fully supported. The
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grant and deny actions fit easily within the current implementation structure and require
less overhead than redirection. We will implement it next. The redirection functionality is
implemented before the traditional DAC permission checks. So any access requests granted
by the firewall still need the permission of the file system before it could access the file.

5.4.1 The Implementation of the Prototype
This prototype implementation is not a fully implementation of FSF. It is rather a basic
start of the fully implementation, but it is sufficient to test out the idea of FSF. Our
implementation of the prototype is on the Linux 2.6.37.1 kernel. We made minimal changes
to the kernel. Only a few kernel files are involved in the modification. We have
implemented FSF successfully on three version of Linux kernel: 2.6.18.2-34, 2.6.24.1 and
then 2.6.37.1.
Two components of FSF reside in the kernel, the filter unit and the rule management
module. The filter unit checks with the rule database, collects data on appropriate attributes,
and determines if an access request should be accepted, denied, or redirected according to
the filter rules loaded in memory. The rule management module is in charge of loading the
rules into the rule database or deleting rules from the database. It also supports addition
and removal of rules at run time. The rule management module is implemented as a device
driver. The functions to load or delete rules are implemented as ioctl operations. Authorized
processes can call these ioctl functions to load or delete the rules. In addition to the two
components that reside in the kernel, the implementation of FSF requires at least two
components that reside outside the kernel. The first is the filter rules stored in files. Second,
a set of application programs, that call the ioctl functions provided by the rule management
module, are needed to manage the rule set in memory. The filter rules are defined on path
name in the rule files. However, in kernel, it is actually defined and stored as a pair of
(inode number, partition number).
Each rule in the filter rule file has three parts: the object, a set of propositions and the action
to take if all the propositions are true for the current access request. The action is described
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by a name (allow, deny, redirect) and associated parameters (e.g., a target for the
redirection). For example, the object might be /etc/passwd, the propositions might be “the
user is not root and the program requesting access this file is /usr/bin/emacs” and the action
might be deny. This rule mediates access to etc/passwd. When the object of an access
request is /etc/passwd, this rule will apply. If the propositions are all true the equest will be
denied. Otherwise the access request still must pass the traditional access control
restrictions.
The operations currently supported for propositions are: “>” (greater than), “<” (less than),
“=” (equal) and “!=” (not equal). The application programs are tools used to load all the
rules from the configuration file into the memory and to add or remove certain rules from
the memory at run time.
Theoretically FSF can support any attributes in the system. In the prototype, we include
some commonly-used attributes:
UID: UID of the subject.
EUID: Effective group ID of the subject.
GID: GID of the subject.
EGUID: Effective GID of the subject.
program: The pathname of the binary file used to create the process initiating the request.
bowner: The owner of the binary file.
rowner: The owner of the target file.
size: Size of the target file.
datetime: The datetime when the access request is sent.
day: The day in a week when the access request is sent.
hour: The hour when the access request is sent.
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UID, GID, EUID, EGID, program and bowner are attributes of the process, or subject. The
rowner and size are the attributes of the object. The three time related attributes are
attributes of the system.
We do not support time attributes on redirection. Since redirection only happens at the
beginning of accessing a file, redirection in the middle of accessing a file may have
confused and inconsistent results.

5.4.2 Work Flow
The work flow graph in Figure 2 shows how the firewall model deals with an access request.
1: A process sends the access request to file system. The access request goes through the
file system firewall first where the firewall checks the filter rules.
2: If there is a matched filter rule, and the action of the rule is to deny, the access request
is denied.
3: If no rule matches, or if there is a matching rule with an allow action, then the request is
forwarded unmodified to the file system. The traditional UNIX access control checks will
be performed on the object of the request.
4: If a redirection rule is matched, the access request is sent to the target file. The original
UNIX access control checking will be performed to the target file.
5: If the access is granted, the process will receive the appropriate response (either against
the target or object).
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Figure 2: Work Flow of FSF

5.4.3 The Structure of the Prototype
The graph in Figure 3 shows how the components of the firewall interact with the kernel
to perform access control. When there is an access request, control is transferred to the
filter unit. The filter unit then collects the information about the access request and searches
the filter rule database to see if there is a rule match on the target of the access request. If
there is no match, the access request will pass through the firewall. If there is a match,
depending on the action defined in the matched filter rule, the filter unit might deny the
access request, let the access request pass through, or get the appropriate file if the access
request needs to be redirected. Control then passes to the traditional access control
mechanism within the operating system.
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In the graph, when there is an access request, control is transferred to the filter unit. The
filter unit then collects the information about the access request and checks with the filter
rule database to see if there is a rule match on the object of the access request. Then
depending on the action received from the filter rule database, the filter unit might deny
the access request, let the access request pass through, or get the target file if the access
request needs to be redirected. Then control is passed to the original access control
processing in the operating system. The rule management module loads filter rules into the
database or remove the filter rules from the filter rule database. This can be done at boot
time or at runtime. Appendix A explains in details on the implementation of the filter unit
in the kernel.

Filter Rule
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User Process

User Space

Accessing
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Kernel Space
Filter Unit
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Following
Operations

Figure 3: Components of FSF

5.4.4 Filter Rule Set Management
Since filter rules in network firewall system are complicated, expert systems have to be
involved to analyze the filter rules. One concern about FSF is whether filter rules in FSF is
as complicated as network filter rules. Even though FSF uses filter rules similar to network
firewall, the filter rules in FSF are confined by the nature of access control in file system,
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which makes the filter rules much less complicated. It is shown by discussing the possible
mistakes and how to detect them.
The possible mistakes and errors can only happen in one of the following two types: in one
filter rules, or in multiple filter rules defined on the same object. The discussion here is
beyond syntax errors, which could be prevented.
The first type of mistakes is the logic errors between predicates in the same filter rule. For
example, hour >19 and hour < 9 are in one filter rule. This type of errors can be detected
by checking common set of appropriate attributes.
The second type of mistakes might occur in multiple filter rules defined on the same object.
For the same object, only_allow rules and deny rules cannot coexist for the same target.
Redirection rules can co-exist with either only_allow rule or deny rule. However,
redirection rules are only checked at the start of accessing a file. So the rule management
tool only needs to check the same type of rules defined on the same object. Only_allow or
deny rules specify all situations the access requests should be granted, or specify all
situations access requests should be denied. Filter rule management tools need to find
repetitions and contradictions. If a new rule defines a situation that is a subset of a precious
rule, they this rule does not need to be added to the filter rule database. If a new rule defines
a condition which is the complement set of the condition of precious rules, then either all
these rules should be removed (only_allow rules) or be substituted with one filter rule (deny
rules). Filter rule management tool needs to detect contradictions among multiple
redirection rules to make sure there are no intersections of situations. If two redirection
rules have predicates on the same set of attributes, and all predicates on this set of attributes
in one rules make predicates on the same set in the other rule true, there is a contradiction.
If two redirection rules do not share any attributes, there is a contradiction.
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5.5 Performance Test
A primary goal of this implementation was to determine whether or not an approach with
this high level of granularity can provide acceptable performance. Our implementation was
within the Linux 2.6.24.1 kernel on a machine built from the SUSE Linux distribution. The
hardware platform contained an Intel Core 2 Duo processor running at 2.13GHz, 1GB
RAM and a 160GB 7200 RPM hard disk. While the impact is significant, we conclude that
the performance is acceptable. Our performance tests are described below.

5.5.1 Filter Rule Loading
The goal of the filter rule load test is to measure the time to load a large number of filter
rules into the kernel. The loadRules program reads a filter rule file and calls the rule
management module in the kernel to load the filter rules. Its function includes looking up
both the source file and target file, translating the files to (inode, partition) pairs, checking
to make sure the predicates are legal and adding this rule to the rule database. Files are
identified by an (inode #, partition#) pair, where partition identifies the partition on which
the file resides and inode identifies the inode number. Rules in the filter configuration file
specify a file name, and as a rule is loaded the name is converted to an (inode, partition)
pair.
We did two sets of tests. For each test, every file in the /usr/lib, /sbin, /lib directories were
directed to a corresponding file in another directory. Each filter rule had 3 predicates. In
test #1, each file has only 1 filter rule specified. While in test #2, each file has 10 filter
rules associated with it.
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Table 2 Test Results of Loading Filter Rule
File Count

Filter Rule

Source

Time(second)

Count

Time per Filter
Rule(second)

18375

18375

/usr/lib

21.5670794

0.0012

18375

183750

/usr/lib

146.809765

0.0008

7879

7879

/sbin, /lib

8.6629696

0.0011

7879

78790

/sbin, /lib

69.1612018

0.0009

The result is listed in table 2. The second column is the file count (the number of files in
this test). The third column is the filter count. The source column indicates where the source
files were from. The first row is the result of test #1. The second row shows the result of
test #2. Loading multiple rules for the same file saves the time of allocating new node and
inserting new node into the filter rule database. Thus, the average time needed loading one
rule in the test #2 is less than in test #1. The average result is listed in the third row. There
are 288794 filter rules in this test. The total time used is 246.2 seconds. The average time
to load a filter rule in this test was 0.00085 seconds.

5.5.2 Rule Set in Memory Test
Filter rules reside in the kernel after they are loaded. Hence, they occupy some amount of
system memory. The goal of this test is to quantify the impact on system performance. We
loaded total 88977 filter rules on 18066 files into the kernel, each with 3 predicates. We
then compiled the Linux 2.6.37.1 kernel. None of the files needed by the compilation was
redirected.
The results are listed table 3. The first column lists the time used to compile the kernel
without loading any rules. The second column shows the result with filter rules loaded. We
ran the test 4 times. Each test was performed immediately after system reboot. The last line
lists the average results. The results show that the overhead caused by 88,977 rules in the
memory is 0.26%.
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Table 3 Overhead of Rule Set in Kernel
Test
Average

Time(second)

Time(second)

No Rule Loaded

Filter Rule Loaded

2045.9713

2051.4333

5.5.3 Path Name Lookup
We implemented redirection in the path name translation portion of the kernel. When a
process requests access to a certain file, it sends the path name of the file to the kernel via
a system call. The kernel performs a lookup to get the inode object of the file. After the
kernel gets the inode object of the source file, FSF checks to see if redirection of the file is
indicated.
This test measured the overhead the redirection causes in path name lookup. We issued a
user level command to test whether a file exists in order to force the path name lookup. We
compare the lookup time consumed with ordinary files, symbolic links (softlinks) and
redirections. The lookup of an ordinary file requires one path name lookup. The lookup of
a softlink involves one path name lookup of the original file and an extra lookup of the
target file. Redirection demands one path name lookup and extra operations for redirection.
Tests were performed on 3108 files. Each file had 13 path components and 1 filename. In
the test on soft links, 10 path components were soft links. In the test for redirection, 10 path
components were redirected. Each filter rule had 1 predicate. The result is an average of 5
runs. Before the FSF redirection, we need to load the filter rules, which would cause lookup
of the files, inodes and dentries. Before each run, we clear caches, inodes and dentries using
Linux sysctl. The results of the test are given in table 4. The FSF kernel without redirection
shows no significant difference from the plain kernel without redirection.
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Table 4 Path Lookup On 3108 files
Time

Time per File (μs)

(second)
SUSE, ordinary file

0.05329

17.1

SUSE, softlink

0.06093

19.6

FSF, ordinary file

0.05389

17.3

FSF, softlink

0.06849

22

FSF kernel, redirection

0.07366

23.7

5.5.4 Reading and Writing Tests
Reading and writing tests are performed on 1147 files. Each run includes 91226 times of
reading or writing of 100 characters. Two scenarios are involved: FSF kernel without any
filter rule loaded, and FSF kernel with filter rules on 1147 files loaded. Table 5 lists the
average total time of reading and writing. The numbers are average values of 1o runs.
Before each run, the dentry cache and inode cache are cleared using sysctl command.
Table 5 Reading and Writing
Time for

Time for

reading(second)

writing(second)

FSF, no filter rules

0.597336

0.145498

FSF, filter rules loaded

0.629063

0.146934
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Chapter 6
Redirection
We discuss one of the filter function of FSF, redirection in this chapter. We explore
capabilities of redirection by itself in both access control and administration aspects. We
explain the rationale behind redirection, redirection on different file types and possible
applications on security and administration.

Redirection [139] is part of file system firewall model. It can be used not only in file system
security, but also file system administration. Many file systems provide the ability to
redirect requests for a particular file to some other point in the file system hierarchy. This
is commonly accomplished through creation of a special file that contains the information
necessary to redirect the request to the appropriate location. FSF redirection is a VFS
modification that supports transparent conditional redirection between two nodes in the file
system hierarchy. The redirection in FSF does not require an on-disk link file. Whether
requests are redirected is determined by a set of filter rules, similar to a firewall filter-rule
set, that are loaded into the kernel. The redirection could happen without the awareness of
users. On the other hand, the conditions on which to redirect can be based on virtually any
element of the system state. With different conditions, the same pathname can point to
different files. Transparent conditional redirection creates custom views of the file
hierarchy. Redirection provides flexible solutions to many practical problems, and can be
used as a component in the implementation of an application. Several example applications
are given including redirecting UNIX domain sockets, access control, intrusion detection
systems and honeypots, and manipulating file hierarchy.
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6.1 Introduction
For many years, file systems have provided users with the ability to redirect an access
request against one file to another point in the directory hierarchy. This is accomplished
through creation of a special file (UNIX symbolic links, Microsoft Windows shortcuts,
junctions or symbolic links, and MAC OS aliases). Requests against this file are then
redirected to another file, the target of the redirection. FSF allows conditional redirection
of file access requests without modification of on-disk data structures. Redirection is
implemented within the Linux Virtual File System (VFS) [84, 85, 86] and is initiated by
the kernel when a set of redirection rules are loaded, similar to the loading of network
firewall rules.
Leaving the on-disk structures unmodified provides a degree of transparency not achieved
by existing approaches. The redirection target is not apparent from a static view of the file
system directory hierarchy or its contents. For example, suppose a user wishes to redirect
requests against the file named source.txt to the file named target.txt. In current file systems,
this would be accomplished by creating a file, e.g. a UNIX symbolic link source.txt that
indicates the target target.txt of the redirection. A listing of file source.txt reveals that it is
being redirected. In FSF redirection, listing source.txt does not reveal that requests are
being redirected. It is sometimes possible to dynamically determine the fact that re-quests
are being diverted. However, in this case, finding the target of the redirection typically
requires a scan over a significant portion of the file system. On the other hand, redirections
can be kept track of, so the related information is available when needed.
The transparency of redirection helps prevent exposing implementation details of certain
tasks. For example, suppose the /var partition is almost full and there is huge free space on
another partition, with FSF di-rectory /var can be redirected to the other partition without
showing ordinary users the real location of the directory. With transparent redirection,
certain files and directories can be hidden from untrusted users. This can serve as a form
of access control to prevent leaking of information. For example, critical directories can be
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hidden to a guest account or a demo account by redirecting the access requests to an empty
directory or staged directories. In this case, the untrusted accounts cannot even list the
original directories, while a lot of directories and files might be set as world readable to all
users in the organization for convenience.
Another feature of the proposed approach is redirection with conditions. It allows the
decision to redirect a request to be based on virtually any element of the system state, e.g.,
user ID (UID), effective user ID (EUID), requesting process, time of day, DTE domain,
the size or the owner of the target file etc. That is, the redirection can be set to only happen
on certain conditions. The condition could be that accessing time is between 9AM and 5PM.
That the UID of the process is neither root nor Alice is a possible condition. That the owner
of the target is Bob is another possible one. Being trans-parent and being conditional are
the features tradition-al link files do not have. Suppose the redirection conditions are
specified on the requesting process, then the specified process would access the target file
instead of the source file. Other processes would still access the original source file. On
different conditions FSF redirection creates different views of the file system. This can be
used in file sharing and access control. Different redirection rules associated with different
attributes of the system can be used to solve different kinds of problems.
FSF redirection can be used by system administrators to solve certain problems or to serve
as a component in applications by creating customized views of the file system hierarchy
under predefined conditions. Normal users may use redirection in a limited way. They can
only set up redirection in their home directory when they are the owner of both source and
target files in the filter rules. FSF redirection supports redirection on normal files,
directories, soft links, named pipes and sockets.

6.2 Related Work
Dynamic or variant symbolic links [87, 88] and context dependent symbolic links [89, 90]
are the closest work comparable with FSF redirection. These types of symbolic links point
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to variant target files or directories. A variable or variant symbolic link is a symbolic link
that has a variable name in the name of the target [88]. The variable is part of the target
name. By specifying the value of the variable, the symbolic link is redirecting to
appropriate target file or directory. For context de-pendent symbolic links, the variable is
the context. Operating systems that support variant symbolic links include NetBSD,
DragonFly BSD and Domain/OS. HP/Tru64 uses the cluster member number as the context in the context dependent symbolic link [88]. Com-pared with variant symbolic links
and context dependent symbolic links, FSF redirection does not need to create special link
files to redirect. The conditions to redirect in FSF redirection are defined as one or more
predicates in the redirection rules, which is much more powerful and flexible. Another
difference is that besides normal files and directories, FSF redirection supports redirection
on symbolic links, named pipes and sockets as well.
Redirecting File System (RedirFS) [49] looks very similar to our work, but they are
inherently different. The RedirFS is a framework without any functions itself. It resides
between the VFS layer and the different file systems. RedirFS is designed to be used by
Linux kernel modules (LSM), called filters in RedirFS. Filters can modify VFS file system
calls through this framework to add functions to manipulate files and their metadata. Users
can develop a filter to perform certain operations, such as compression and encryption, and
then use RedirFS to interact with kernel. Both RedirFS and FSD redirection have the
keywords of redirect and filter. The implementations are both on Linux kernel 2.6.
However, RedirFS is a frame work for additional functionality, while FSF redirection
redirects access requests of one file to another file.

6.3 FSF Redirection
FSF redirection provides transparent conditional redirection from one point of the file
system hierarchy to another point without extra link files added to the file system. The
same file can be accessed through multiple pathnames. Adding conditions to FSF
redirection makes the redirection much more flexible. Under certain conditions, access
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requests for one path-name could be redirected to different files as specified in the matched
redirection rule.

6.4 Filter Rule
The redirection in file systems resembles the forward operation for network packages in
network firewall. Through network filter rules, certain packages are for-warded to another
node in the network. Through FSF redirection filter rules, certain access requests are
redirected to another file for file systems. A redirection filter rule has three parts: the source
file, the target file and a set of predicates on system attributes. The source file is the original
file to be accessed. The target file is the file being redirected to. The set of predicates serve
as the conditions of the redirection. The access requests against the source file will be
redirected to the target file only if the set of predicates all are evaluated to be true. A filter
rule is defined as follows:
filter rule: (source file, target file, filters: {p1˄p2˄p3 …˄ pn}).

The p1, p2,…, pn are the predicates on system attributes. The relations between the
predicates are logic and. System attributes could be about the binary process, the target of
the access request and the system itself. Example attributes are user ID(UID), group
ID(GID), effective user ID(EUID), effective group ID(EGID), name of binary process,
owner ID of the target file(OUID), size of the target file(TSIZE), host name, time of day,
etc. Example predicate could be (UID != root) and (time-of-day > 9am ) and (time-of-day
< 5pm).

6.5 Redirection for Supported File Types
MaskFS works across partitions and file systems. It supports transparent redirection of
normal files, directories, symbolic links, named pipes and sockets. It does not support
redirection of block device or character device.
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If a normal file is redirected, the access requests of the file will be against the target file
specified in the matched filter rule.
File system hierarchy can be visualized as an upside down tree. Redirection of a directory
file is redirecting the sub-tree of the source directory to the sub-tree of target directory.
From the view of the tree, the sub-tree of source directory looks like being substituted by
the target sub-tree.
Figure 4 below depicts the redirection from dir1/dir21 to dira/dirba. Tree (A) is the original
directory tree of dir1. It is what the directory looks like without any redirection. Tree (B)
is the directory tree of dira. Tree (C) shows what dir1 looks like with redirection, where
dir21 sub-tree is substituted by dirba sub-tree from dira directory tree.
A symbolic link file is handled similar to regular file in redirection. The link file stops
linking to the original target file. Access requests to the link file is redirected to the target
file specified in the matching filter rule.
Named pipes, or FIFOs (first in, first out), are used as one type of inter-process
communication. Named pipes have on disk file names and allow two separate processes to
communicate with each other by the name of the pipe. Processes can open them by opening
the pathnames to read from the pipes or write to them. MaskFS supports the redirection of
named pipes. A named pipe can be redirected to another named pipe. Then the data sent to
source pipe will be redirected to the target pipe. A process would read from or write to the
target pipe specified by the matched filter rule other than the pipe with the name it requested.
This changed the destination of the data sent to the pipe.
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Figure 4: Redirection of a directory.
The sockets we discuss are UNIX domain sockets, that is, inter-process sockets. Sockets
work in client-server mode and they are duplex-capable. They have pathnames on disk as
well. In MaskFS when a socket is redirected to another socket, the client process associated
with the source socket would communicate with a different process through the target
socket. Since sockets are duplex-capable, it should be dealt with extra care to apply
redirection to sockets.
Character and block device files are interfaces for device drivers with which the
applications can communicate with hardware devices. Even though device files can be
opened in the same way as normal files, further operation on the opened files are specific
to the different hardware devices. Redirections of device files are not meaningful on most
cases, so we do not support redirection of device files.

6.6 Applications
Redirection is a fundamental and very convenient tool. It manipulates the file system
namespace and provides virtual views of the file system hierarchy for user ac-counts or
processes. We will discuss several applications from the aspects of both an administrator
and an ordinary user. To apply redirection, it takes two steps. One is to set up the filter
rules; and the other is to load the rules into kernel by calling application program load-rule.
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6.6.1 Used by Administrators
6.6.1.1. Redirecting Inter-process Communication (IPC) Sockets
IPC sockets [91], or UNIX domain sockets, are used to exchange data between processes
on the same host. When redirection is applied to a socket, it changes the destination of the
specified socket. One experiment we did is to manage printing jobs between two printers
by redirecting a printer’s socket to the other one’s socket. These two printers are installed
on the same machine. Printer1 uses socket cups1.sock to get the print data send by users.
Printer2 uses socket cups2.sock.
Redirect: /var/run/cups/cups1.sock
/var/run/cups/cups2.sock
filter 3: gid = csgrad hour > 10 hour < 15
This filter rule defines that during peak period 10am – 3pm, the print jobs for Printer1 will
be redirected to Printer2 for the group of ‘csgrad’. This is a much simple case. But the
flexibility provided by filters makes it easy to deal with much complex and practical
problems. For example, we can write a wrapper script for the print command such that
when the files to print are more than certain size, the printing jobs will be redirected to a
printer that only prints big files.
6.6.1.2. Access Control on Extra Conditions
On current Unix/Linux, access control systems include traditional UNIX discretionary
access control, access control list, Capabilities and security extensions such as SELinux
[32] which supports Type Enforcement [92] and Role Based Access Control (RBAC) [93].
On most of the systems, the security policies are defined on the subjects, either account
credentials or process domains. The advantage with redirections is security policies can be
specified on more elements besides subjects in the security policies, such as the time of
day, size of the target resource, last modified time of the target, etc. With redirection,
denied access requests will be redirected to an empty directory or file.
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The following filter rules are used to set up security policies such that the critical data file
/billing/account/data1 can only be accessed during workdays in rule1, by the program
/usr/sbin/techServ in rule2, and when the size of the file data1 is smaller than 100MB in
rule3.
rule 1:
Redirect: /billing/account/data1
/empty
filter 5: day != Monday day ! = Tuesday day ! = Wednesday day ! = Thursday day !=
Friday
rule 2:
Redirect: /billing/account/data1
/empty
filter 1: program !=/usr/sbin/techServ
rule 3:
Redirect: /billing/account/data1
/empty
filter 1: size > 100MB
These access control policies could be implemented in certain access control systems.
However, redirection provides straight-forward, light-weight and flexible al-ternative
solutions.
6.6.1.3. Host Intrusion Detection System / Honey-pot
Redirection can be used to implement host intrusion detection systems [94] or honeypots
[95]. Both Intrusion detection systems and honey pots need to monitor the running systems
especially untrusted processes. With redirection, access requests for system resources made
by these untrusted processes can be redirected to staged resources. The original data was
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untouched by the untrusted processes. This makes it possible to lure and keep the attackers,
and at the same time, keep the intrusion detection system or the honey pot available and
running.
Redirect: /etc/passwd
/staged/etc/passwd
filter 1: 1=1
This filter rule specifies that once this filter rule is loaded, all access requests for file
/etc/passwd will go to the staged file /staged/etc/passwd .

6.6.2 Used by Ordinary Users
Ordinary users may use redirection in a limited way. We require that the user that specifies
the filter rules is the owner of both the source file and the target file. These two files have
to be in the user’s home directory.
6.6.2.1. Create Custom Views of the File Hierarchy
Dropbox is a cloud service that provides remote storage so we can access our data from
different places using different devices.
Most of the time, the files in the Dropbox are copies of files on original file system on disk.
They are copied from different directories scattered in the file system, or even from
different devices. We need to keep track of where the files are originally from in the local
file hierarchy. At the same time, among the copies in Dropbox and on local disk, we need
to decide which one is the most recently modified copy.
Redirection can be used to access the file in Dropbox through the local file hierarchy. This
answers both of the questions: where the file is from and which version is the newest.
Suppose /home/Alice/work/projectA is the directory that has a copy in the Dropbox.
Redirect: /home/Alice/work/projectA
/home/Alice/Dropbox/projectA
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filter1: uid = Alice
The above filter rule sets up the transparent redirection from /home/Alice/work/projectA
to /home/Alice/Dropbox. After loading this filter rule, Alice can work in the exactly same
local directory. There are no extra links and no modifications on the projectA directory.
However, she actually accesses the projectA directory in the Dropbox, and she always
accesses the newest version of the files.
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Chapter 7
Comparisons of Access Control Systems
In this Chapter, we will discuss the theoretical comparisons of access control models. The
importance of access control models on information systems has been recognized decades
ago. Since then many access control models have been designed and implemented, and
many access control systems have been deployed on various systems. The research
community of information security has been interested in the comparisons of access control
models. The comparisons of these access control models serve as references for system
designers and end-users when they need to choose access control models to meet their
protection requirements.
Two methods are presented in this chapter in terms of comparisons of access control
models. One is to compare the express power of different access control models through
simulation. This is the dominant method of comparing access control models in research
community. The other is a straight-forward comparison of access control properties based
on defined quality criteria.
Before we further our discussion of comparisons, first we need to make a clarification
between access control models and access control systems. An access control model is
more on the theoretical design side, while an access control system is more on the
implementation side. An access control system includes specifications of access control
policies, chosen access control model(s), implementation of the access control model(s)
and deployment of the implementation on the information system [122]. One access control
model may have multiple different implementations with different data structures, end-user
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interfaces, efficiency and performance on different access control systems. In this chapter,
we will discuss the comparison of access control models, rather than access control systems.

7.1 Theory on Compare Expressive Power of Access Control
Models
Comparing the expressive power of access control models is a fundamental problem in
computer security. The comparison is usually achieved through simulation. That is, if an
access control model A can be simulated by another access control model B, then access
control model B is said to be at least as expressive as access control model A.
The previous research on comparing expressive powers of access control models [114, 115,
116, 117, 118, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131] can mainly be
grouped into three categories based on comparing approaches. The first is to enforce the
access control policies of another access control model [114, 116,126]. The second is to
implement one access control model by another through state mappings and/or statetransition mappings [120,121,124,125,127,128]. The third is to add queries of certain
rights at certain states on top of the second category [123,129,130].
Most of these previous simulations use the implementation method, that is, to implement
the access control policies of another model or to simulate the state-transitions of another
access control model. While others put an emphasis on formal definitions of simulations
and comparisons of expressive powers of access control models that will preserve security
properties [121,124,127,128,129,130] during the process of simulation. The security
properties include availability, mutual exclusion and bounded safety [130]. We will refer
to these two methods as implementation method and formal state-transition method
respectively in this chapter. First we will visit the formal state-transition method.
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7.1.1 State-transition Simulation
In an access control model, a protection state is the collection of the values of all the
configurations and entities in the system that involved in access control. In the simulation
of access control models, actions or operations that trigger one protection state to transit to
the next state are recognized as relevant actions and operations. The following two
simulations both preserve the security properties.
Ammann, Sandhu and Lipton [121] use directed graphs to represent the access control
scheme. Each access control scheme consists of a set of states and state-transition rules.
An access control model is a set of access control schemes. They define a scheme A
simulates scheme B if and only if both of the following are true.
1. For every state a reachable by scheme A, there exists some correspondent state b
reachable by scheme B.
2. For every state b reachable by scheme B, either the state a that corresponds to b is
reachable by scheme A, or there exists some successor state b* of b such that the state a*
that corresponds to b* is reachable by scheme A.
Comparisons of expressive power are defined below:
Model Y is less expressive than model X if and only if there exists at least one scheme A
in model X that cannot be simulated by any scheme B in model Y.
Model Y is as expressive as model X if and only if for every scheme A in model X, there
exists a scheme B in model Y such that scheme B can simulate scheme A.
Model X is equivalent to model Y if and only of model X is as expressive as model Y and
model Y is as expressive as model X.
Tripunitara and Li [129,130] define an access control scheme to be the state-transition
system <S, Q, r, T>, in which S is a set of states, Q is a set of access control queries, r is
defined as relation S × Q Æ {true, false}, and the T is a set of the state-transition rules.
They define reduction as:
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Given two access scheme A= < SA, QA, rA, TA> and B < SB, QB, rB, TB >, for every a  אSA
and tA אTA, <b, tB > = f (<a, tA >), the mapping f is defined as a reduction if it has the
following two properties:
1. For every state a1 that is reachable from a, and every query qA in scheme A, there exists
a reachable equivalent state b1 that is reachable from b, that gives that same answer for
query f(qA).
2. For every state b1 that is reachable from b and every query qA in scheme A, there exists
a reachable equivalent state a1 that is reachable from a, that gives the same answer for
query f(qA).
The method of comparing the expressive power of access control models is defined below:
Given two access control models A and B, B is at least as expressive as A if for every
scheme in A there exists a reduction from it to a scheme in B. In addition, if for every
scheme in B, there exists a reduction from it to a scheme in A, then we say that A and B
are equivalent in expressive power.

7.1.2 Complexity of Formal Simulations of FSF Model
We try to apply the state-transition simulation theory to FSF model, but it is hard to find
an access control model that has matching state with FSF. In FSF multiple attributes are
involved in the decisions on whether to grant or deny access requests. These attributes can
be subject-related, object-related or system-related.
The state-transitions in most access control models happen on actions or commands from
the subjects. However, in FSF, the state-transition is more complex. Some changes may or
may not be triggered by the same action. For example, conditions on the size of object
could be changed through modification command. However, not every modification
command changes the answer of the related query. For instance, if a rule specifies that a
user cannot write to a file when it is larger than 100M. The query that whether the user is
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allowed to write to the file answers true before the file grows to 100M. But after that it will
answer false. There are attributes that change on their own, such as time. A query returned
false the last second might return true this second even though there are no actions or
commands involved. For these two kinds of state-transitions in FSF, there are no matching
state-transitions in most of the access control models.
Because no matching state-transitions exist for certain transitions in FSF, we cannot apply
the formal state-transition simulation theory to FSF and another access control model. If
we want to apply the formal simulation theory to construct a reduction from FSF to another
access control model, the property #1 cannot be satisfied. If we want to construct a
reduction from another model to FSF, then the property #2 cannot be satisfied.

7.2 Simulation by Implementation
Some access control models have a structural definition on how to specify access control
policies. For instance, DTE defines domains and types first, then the access control policies
are expressed on different domains and types. RBAC defines roles first, then specifies
access control policies by associating permissions with roles, and associating users with
roles. While other access control models define the access control policies directly. Such
as ACL, Capabilities and FSF. FSF includes multiple decision-making elements than most
access control models. Most access control models base the decisions of allowing or
denying access requests on one of the user identities. DTE bases the decisions on subject
domains. RBAC bases the decisions on roles. While in FSF, the decisions are on multiple
elements or attributes. The attributes can be user identity, domain, role and or any subset
of attributes. Theoretically FSF is able to accommodate many other access control models.
Below we will present how to simulate TE with FSF using the approach of implementation.
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7.2.1 Type Enforcement (TE)
Type Enforcement (TE) groups subjects into domains and objects into types. It defines the
allowed operations a domain has over types, and other domains. Same with FSF, it is a
rule-based policy model, that is, TE and FSF both specify in their policies what access
requests should be allowed and what access requests should be denied. In contrast the other
type is property-based access control policy, which specifies the security properties to
enforce, such as in Bell–LaPadula model.
7.2.1.1 Original Type Enforcement
The original type enforcement policies are specified in two tables. Domain definition table
(DDT) [3] defines the allowed accesses a domain may have over a type, such as read, write
and execute. Another table domain transition table (DTT) [3] specifies whether a subject
in a domain can transit to another domain, which is accomplished by allowed process
execution. The transition table is defined as true or false table. If a process in one domain
is allowed to transit to another domain, then the corresponding item in the table is labeled
as “true”. Otherwise it is “false”.
7.2.1.2 TE in SELinux
SELinux uses policy language instead of DDT and DTT tables to define access control
policies. TE in SELinux is refined from its original definition. The policy rules of domains
over types are the same as the original TE. TE in SELinux defines more options during
domain transitions. Three criteria have to been satisfied in a domain transition in SELinux
TE.
1.

The process in origin domain must have execute right on the application program

2.

The application program is an entry point for the target domain

3.

The origin domain must be allowed to transition to the target domain

Three possible rights are defined on domain transition, NULL, auto, and exec.
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Type 1: NULL. When a process in domain A executes one of the entry point programs of
domain B, and the access right domain A has over domain B is NULL, the child process
will continue to run in domain A. If the child process is not an entry point program, the
child process remains in the parent’s domain. Most of the time in SELinux, the child
process remains in the domain of parent process.
Type 2: auto. When a process in domain A executes one of the entry point programs of
domain B, and the access right domain A has over domain B is auto, the process will
continue to run in domain B.
Type 3: exec. When a process in domain A executes the entry point program of domain B,
the access right domain A has over domain B is exec, and the process explicitly requests
to run in domain B, the process will run in domain B. This type of transitions happen very
rarely.
The domain of a process is decided by three element: the program itself, the domain of the
parent process and the domain transition rules. The same program can be executed and run
in different domains.

7.2.2 FSF Implementation of TE
A protection state of TE is defined as <S, O, D, T, R, dtr, ddr>.
S is a set of subjects. More specifically, S is a set of processes. Each subject is associated
with a domain type.
O is a set of objects.
D is a set of defined domain types.
T is a set of object types.
R is a set of rights.
dtr is a mapping on (D×T)ÆR that defines rights domains have over types.
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ddr is a mapping on (D×D)Æ{auto, NULL} that defines allowed domain transitions. For
simplicity, we do not include the exec type of transition which will require extra operations
on the involved process.
A protection state of FSF is defined as <S, O, R, A, f>.
S is a set of subjects, O is a set of objects, R is a set of rights, A is a set of all attributes,
and f is a mapping on (O×A)ÆR that defines FSF filter rules.
This implementation is constructed on the same set of objects, subjects and rights. O in TE
maps to O in FSF; R in TE maps to R in FSF; Domain in TE is mapped to domain attribute
in FSF.
7.2.2.1 Access Control Related TE Commands
We identify ten TE commands and operations that will modify the protection states.
1. Create an object.
2. Remove an object.
3. Assign a type to an object.
4. Modify the type of an object.
5. Define a domain transition.
6. Remove a domain transition.
7. Define a domain (assign rights a domain has over a type).
8. Modify a domain (revoke rights a domain has over a type).
9. Execute a program.
10. Exit of a process.
7.2.2.2 FSF Implementation of TE Commands
Now we will implement each of the TE commands.
1. Create an object.
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This operation adds a new object to the state. However, this operation does not change any
permissions. So no corresponding extra operations other than the creation of the object are
needed in FSF.
2. Remove an object.
On destroying an object O in TE, FSF needs to remove the filter rules on this object. It
means to call the operation removeObjectFilterRules(O) in FSF. The operation
removeObjectFilterRules() will remove all the filter rules defined on object O.
3. Assign a type to an object.
In TE, assigning a type T to an object O means granting the rights domains have over this
type T to this object. In FSF, for each domain Di that has right set Ri over type T, it will
generate a filter rule with O as the object, Ri as the right set, and {domain = Di} as attribute
predicate by calling genFilterRule (O, Ri, {domain = Di}).
4. Modify the type of an object.
In TE, to modify the type of an object from T1i to T2i means to grant the rights domains
have over the type T2i instead of T1i to this object. In FSF, removeObjectFilterRules(O)
operation is called to remove all filter rules defined on the same object O. Then FSF needs
to call genFilterRule (O, Ri, {domain = Di}) for each domain that have rights defined over
T2i.
5. Define a domain transition.
TE defines a domain transition by specifying the entry-point program, parent domain and
the child domain. Accordingly, FSF needs to save this transition rule by calling
saveTransitionRule(program, (domain_p, domain_c)).
6. Remove a domain transition.
TE removes a domain transition by disallowing the domain transition from domain_p to
domain_c and unset the entry-point program. FSF calls removeTranistioinRule(program,
(domain_p, domain_c)) to remove this rule.
7. Execute a program.
In TE, executing the entry program of a domain may cause domain transition. TE needs to
check whether current process has the right to enter the new domain by executing the entrypoint program. Correspondingly, FSF needs to get the domain value of current process:
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domain_p = getAttribute (domain, parent_process), then checks the program to execute to
see if it is an entry point program with parent domain equals the domain_p. If this is the
case, FSF returns the new domain and set the domain of the executing program domain_c
by calling setAttribute (new_domain, child_process).
8. Exit of a process.
The exit of a process means a process is finished. However, nothing related to domains and
types is modified. So in FSF, no extra operations are needed.
9. Assign rights set R a domain D has over a type T.
For each of the object Oi with the type T, FSF needs to execute genFilterRule (Oi, R,
{domain = D}).
10. Revoke rights set R of a domain D has over a type T.
In FSF, for each of the object with the type, execute, removeFilterRules(Oi, R, {domain =
D}).
The above implementation shows that FSF can simulate TE. Including attributes in the FSF
makes it a very flexible access control model. The attributes can include a domain, a role,
or the owner of the object. TE is just one example of the access control models FSF can
accommodate.

7.3 The Comparisons on Specified Quality Criteria
Another approach is to compare different access control models against specified quality
criteria. To compare two or more specific access control models, we need to choose the
criteria that are both relevant and meaningful. In this section, we will explain the criteria
[1, 96, 122] we choose and the results of comparisons. We select four access control models:
DAC, DTE, RBAC and our FSF. Table 6 summarizes the results of comparisons.
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7.3.1 Comparing Criteria
7.3.1.1 C1: Administrative Policies
Administrative policies define who manages the access control policies and how. That is,
they define who has the permissions to add, modify, and remove the access control policies
in the access control model. The most well-known type is centralized administration. In
centralized administration, the access control policies are managed by the administrator(s).
With ownership, the owner of the resources has the right to grant or revoke the permissions
of the resources.
In DAC, the access permissions are decided based on the identities of subjects. The owner
of a resource has the capability to grant access to other subjects. So it has the type of
ownership in terms of administrative policies. In DTE, administrators define domains and
types and set up the DTE policies for domains, so it is a centralized. In FSF, administrators
have the capabilities to specify filter rules, load them and remove them from the filter
database. It is centralized policy administration.
In RBAC administrators define roles and groups and the appropriate rights for each role
and group. The users are assigned to one or more roles and get the rights associated to the
roles. So it supports centralized policy administration. On the other hand, the
administration rights can be associated with owner of resources, so it can support
ownership as well.
Model
Administrative

DAC
Ownership

DTE

RBAC

Centralized Centralized /

Policies

FSF
Centralized

Ownership

7.3.1.2 C2: Separation of Duties
Separation of Duties is a fundamental principle in computer security. It means multiple
people are required to complete a critical task or a security process, since multiple people
are less likely to be compromised at the same time.
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In RBAC, constraints can be used to achieve separation of duties. For example, two roles
can be defined as mutually exclusive, so a user can only be in one of these mutually roles.
The other three models do not support separation of duties directly.
Models

DAC

DTE

RBAC

FSF

Separate of duties

Not support

Not support

Support

Not support

7.3.1.3 C3: Definition of Least Privilege
Least privilege means that a subject should be given only the privileges that are needed to
complete a task. Besides DAC, All the other three access control models can be set up to
support least privileges.
7.3.1.4 C4: Delegation
Delegation means that a non-administrator user has the capability of granting permissions
to other users. DAC supports this. DTE and FSF are MAC access control models. Only
administrators can grant permissions to users. In RBAC, the rights of granting permissions
can be associate with certain roles.
Models

DAC

DTE

RBAC

FSF

Delegation

support

Not support

Support

Not support

7.3.1.5 C5: Implementation Mechanisms
DAC can be implemented with access control lists, access control matrix, or capabilities.
DTE defines domain types, resource types, and permissions domains have over types and
other domains in policies files. RBAC’s implementation mechanisms include roles, role
hierarchy, constraints and administration of assignments of user-role and role-permission.
FSF uses policy files with filter rules on conditions.
7.3.1.6 C6: Conditions
Conditions can be system-dependent conditions, content-dependent conditions, or historydependent conditions. In DAC, permissions are defined based on user identity. In DTE,
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permissions are defined based on the type of the process and type of the resource. RBAC
associates permissions with roles. No conditions are involved in these three models.
Models

DAC

DTE

RBAC

FSF

Conditions

Not support

Not support

Not support

Support

7.3.1.7 Open (Negative) and Close (Positive) Authentication
Open authentication means that the access requests are granted by default. An access
request is denied only when it has a matching rule in authentication stating otherwise. On
the contrary, close authentication means that the access requests are denied by default. An
access request is allowed only when it has a matching rule in authentication stating
otherwise.
Models

DAC

DTE

RBAC

FSF

Open and Close

close

close

close

open

Authentication
Table 6 Comparisons on Specified Criteria
C1:Administrative

DAC

DTE

RBAC

FSF

Ownership

Centralized

Centralized/

Centralized

policies
C2:Separation of

Ownership
Not support

Not support

Support

Not support

C3:Least privileges

Not support

Support

Support

Support

C4:Delegation

Support

Not support

Support

Not support

C5:Implementation

ACLs,

Domain and

hierarchy,

Filter rules on

mechanisms

ACM, or

type

constraints,

attributes

Capabilities

enforcement

user-role

duty

and rolepermission
assignments
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C6: Conditions

Not support

Not support

Not support

Support

C7:Close (Positive)

Close

Close

Close

Open

and Open(Negative)
Authentication

7.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we present two different approaches of comparisons of access control
models. One is through simulation to compare the expressive powers. If an access control
model can simulate another access control model, we say the former access control model
is at least as expressive as the later one. We simulated TE model with FSF and showed that
FSF is more expressive than TE, since there are state-transitions in FSF that cannot be
simulated by TE. Theoretically, with attributes, FSF can accommodate many other access
control models. The other approach is quality comparisons based on related quality criteria.
It provides clear results in terms of different access control properties. We compared DAC,
DTE, RBAC and our FSF on seven criteria.
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Chapter 8
User Study of Access Control Systems
In this chapter, we explain the design, executing and the results of a user study [138] on
three selected access control systems1. This chapter includes the work that is published in
SIN13 (for copyright information see Appendix: Reuse License).

Access control system is one of the key components in the security settings of computer
systems. It protects system resources from unauthorized access attempts. Many access
control systems have been designed and made available to administrators. However, there
are access control systems that are rarely used, such as access control list [97]. There are
other access control systems users would like to turn off, such as SELinux. Access control
systems only take affect when they are used. The work we show in this chapter is an effort
to understand and improve the usability of access control systems. We conduct a user study
to observe the process users use three access control systems: UNIX discretionary access
control (DAC), SELinux, and file system firewall we designed and implemented. We
present the results of the study, analyze the results and propose our recommendations that
could improve user experience with access control systems.

8.1 Introduction
An access control system on operating systems defines the operations that active entities,
such as processes or users, may perform over resources or other active entities. Over the
years, many access control systems have been deployed on various operating systems.
1

This work is published in the 6th International Conference on Security of Information and Networks
(SIN2013).
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These access control systems implement substantially different abstractions of the requests
made by processes against system resources.

Access control is a last line of defense for protecting computer system resources from a
compromised process. It is the traditional center of gravity of computer security [98].
However, some powerful access control systems are rarely used. For example, access
control lists (ACLs) are not used very often [97]. Other access control systems, such as
SELinux, may be turned off1 on many systems even though the users need the protection
SELinux could provide. Why would administrators choose not to use an access control
system? It may be challenging to understand the existing security policies. Setting up a
new set of access control policies may require a comprehensive understanding of the access
control system. The process of setting up security policies may easily lead to errors.
Learning to use the access control system may be intimidating. Clearly, usability issues can
have serious security consequences.

In this chapter, we explain the design and the conduct of a user study on three different
access control systems on Linux. UNIX DAC system, SELinux system and file system
firewall designed and implemented by us. The goal is to study how well the potential users
can finish specified tasks in each access control systems, and to look for suggestions to
improve the usability of access control systems. The subjects are undergraduate students
and graduate students in computer science major. They have very limited experience on
using access control systems. The results show that with some training and sufficient
information, they are capable of finishing most basic tasks. They have difficulties on more
complex tasks which requires more knowledge on both Linux systems and access control
systems. Based on the results and our findings from the study, we propose
recommendations that might improve the usability of access control systems.
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8.2 Background and Related Work
A great deal of effort has been devoted to bridging the gap between security and usability
in information systems over the last decade [99]. The Symposium on Usable Privacy and
Security (SOUPS) has been held since 2005. Additional workshops on usable security have
been held more recently. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 924111 standard definition of usability is “the extent to which a product can be used by specified
users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction in a specified
context of use.” One branch of this research is human computer interface and security
(HCISec) [100]. Much previous work emphasizes the interfaces [101] of security systems,
such as password systems [102, 103]. Another branch focuses on misconfigurations of
access control policies [104, 105, 106].
There have been a number of other access control user studies. Felt et al. [107] study the
permission warnings during application installation on android system. Smetters and Good
[108] examine the real-world use of access control features in standard document sharing
systems and propose a set of design guidelines on access control system on these systems.
Motiee et al. [109] investigate the use of low-privileged user accounts and user account
control on Windows. Cao and Iverson [110] have conducted a user study to compare
intentional access control management system wizard and ACL editor on distributed file
system. Mazurek et al. [111] give guidelines for designing access control system for home
computers and other digital devices based on feedback from user interviews.
Cliffe et al. [112] have conducted a user study on Linux to compare FBAC-LSM with
SELinux and AppArmor. This is a study on Linux system involving three access control
systems, which is similar to our study. The tasks for participants are to confine two
applications, with one of them containing a Trojan horse. They concluded that
functionality-based schemes such as FBAC_LSM empower non-expert end users to
confine their applications and protect themselves from a variety of prevalent security
threats [112]. Comparison of access control systems was not a goal in our study. We chose
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these three access control systems, because they can provide different angles to observe
the participants. Our work was an effort to improve usability of access control systems.

8.3 Design of User Study
This user study had two goals. One was to examine how well the participants could use
these three access control systems to accomplish selected common tasks. The other was to
study how users perceive and use different access control systems, in order to identify how
the usability of access control systems might be improved.

The selected access control systems are inherently different (as are all access control
systems). Though they have common goals, these systems have different abstractions,
settings, and features. The ability of users to complete standard tasks, the processes
employed by users to complete the tasks, and the perceptions of participants using these
three systems will generate much more meaningful information than a single system.

8.3.1 Participants
Usable security is centered on the people who perform security operations. Usability is
always within a certain context. A system usable to experts might not be usable to ordinary
end users. The participants in this study are senior undergraduate and graduate computer
science majors who have a limited knowledge of only the UNIX DAC system. They have
a high degree of computing literacy, but they are essentially all beginners in the special
domain of access control systems.

8.3.2 Three Access Control Systems
In this section, we give an overview of the access control systems selected for the study.
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UNIX DAC
The UNIX discretionary access control system has widespread use. In UNIX DAC, the
access permissions of a file include read, write and execute. Permissions are specified for
each of the file owner, the file group, and everyone else (world). The owner of the resource
has the discretion to delegate the privileges other users have over the resource he owns.

User accounts have a distinct user identifier (UID). Groups contain a collection of users.
Each group has a distinct group identifier (GID). A user is in one primary group and might
be in several secondary groups.

Each running process has an effective UID and GID, which is typically the UID of the user
that created the process, and the GID of the group in which the user was operating at the
time the process was created. This effective UID and GID are used to determine the access
allowed to a resource. A UID of zero (root) allows virtually unlimited access to all system
resources.

SELinux
SELinux is a mandatory access control (MAC) security mechanism implemented in the
Linux kernel starting with Linux 2.6 kernel. It provides flexible, fine-grained and powerful
access control. It supports type enforcement (TE) model, role-based access control (RBAC)
and multiple-level security (MLS). Our study focuses on TE. In TE [3], subjects (processes)
are grouped into different domains and objects (files, directories, device files, etc.) are
grouped into types. Access control policies specify permissions domains have to types and
other domains. In SELinux, each subject and each object are associated with a security
context in the following format:
user:role:type
The first item in the triple is SELinux user (which is different from the UNIX user). The
last item in the context triple is the TE type. TE security policies are defined between
86

subject types and object types and between subject types. The SELinux user is associated
with the types. Since SELinux is mandatory, only the administrator can setup and modify
the access control policies. Ordinary users cannot setup their own access control policies.
During runtime, SELinux will check the security context triples to decide whether an
access request should be granted or denied. Most of the SELinux systems run in the “target”
policy mode. That means only the targeted subjects or objects are protected. Other entities
are labeled with unconfined types and are not protected by SELinux.

File System Firewall
File system firewall (FSF) system is a novel access control system we implemented in the
Linux kernel, specifically, on openSUSE. No participant had used the FSF prior to the
study. Access control policies are specified in a policy file with filter rules. Each filter rule
is an access control restriction for one particular file. The filter rule defines on what
condition an access request against the file or directory should be allowed or denied. Three
permissions are defined: read, write and execute. FSF acts before traditional UNIX access
control. By default, if no filter rules are specified on a file or directory, an access request
for the file will go to the traditional UNIX DAC system. Three types of filter rules are
defined: deny rule, only allow rule and redirection rule. The filter rules are defined against
resources with file structures on disk so far, such as files, directories, links, pipes and
sockets. The system we used in this user study is a prototype access control system.

In FSF, the administrator can load these access control policies into the kernel or remove
them from the kernel over any files and directories on the system.

8.3.3 Design of the Tasks
From the aspect of users, these three access control systems have different key components.
The UNIX DAC system includes the following components.
x

the root account
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x

commands and GUI tools to modify the permissions

x

user accounts and groups

x

setUID or setGID programs

x

sudo, chroot jails and other mechanisms

TE itself is an access control model fairly straightforward to understand. Users must
understand the basics of SELinux before they can use SELinux, which includes at least the
following.
x

more refined permissions defined by SELinux besides read, write and
execute

x

related domain types and resource types on the systems

x

related SELinux macros

x

SELinux commands tools to check, set and modify SELinux settings,
Boolean variables and policies

x

SELinux policy modules and policy files structures

The basic components of FSF system are listed below.
x

commands to load, check and remove the rules

x

the form of a configuration file with predicates

x

three types of filter rules: deny, only allow and redirection

x

the relations between predicates and multiple filter rules on the same
object the relations between predicates and multiple filter rules on the
same object

8.3.4 Tasks Used in Study
Each of these access control systems implements a different abstraction and hence has a
different set of features, settings, etc. Each has its strengths and weaknesses. The goal of
this study was not a technical comparison of the systems, but to use these different systems
to gain insight into access control system usability.
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Since the systems are so different, it did not make sense to use the same set of tasks for all
three systems. Each task set had two parts. Part 1 included the basic tasks for each system.
We selected these basic tasks according to the key components of each system. Tasks in
part 2 were selected so that the same basic function was performed using the unique
features of each system. The common goal was to confine a process or a daemon. FSF
identified the process or daemon to confine by its absolute path name. The tasks are listed
in table 7, 8 and 9.
Table 7 UNIX DAC Tasks
Task
1

Part 1

2
3
4
5

Part 2

6
7

Task Description

Object

Prevent other accounts from

Basic permission setting

accessing a user's files
Multiple accounts sharing directory
and files
Add directories to sharing in task
#2
Protect a public shared directory
Assign a ordinary user a privileged
task

Selective accounts sharing
Modify current policy
Sticky bit and umask
Confine root with sudo

Examine current access control set Understand access control scheme on
up for a particular process

a process set up by others

Set up access control scheme for a Design access control scheme on a
daemon

process for certain requirements
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Table 8 SELinux Tasks
Task

Task description

Part 2

Part 1

1
2

Change permissions using
SELinux Boolean variable
Modify object SELinux contexts to
different permissions

Object
Modify Boolean variable
Modify SELinux contests
Create a minimal SELinux policy

3

Setup a simple SELinux policies

4

Debug an existing SELinux policy Audit2allow

5
6

Read an existing policy setup on a
process

module

Read and understand existing policy

Set up policy to confine a daemon Design and create SELinux policies

Table 9 File System Firewall Tasks
Task

Description

Part 1

1
2

Part 2

3

Directories and files can only be
accessed during a period of time
Prevent other accounts (including
root) from accessing certain files
Redirect access request to another
object

Object
Time attributes
Confine root
Redirection rule

4

Read filter rules set for a process

Read current filter rules

5

Create filter rules for a daemon

Create filter rules

8.4 Measurement
ISO 9241-11 states that there are three key components in usability measurements:
effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction. Kainda et al. [100] include three extra possible
measurement metrics: accuracy, memorability, and knowledge/skill to evaluate the
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usability of a system. In the evaluation of access control system, accuracy is measured as
how accurate participants could complete their tasks. Memorability is about data that need
to be memorized, such as passwords in authentication systems. There are no this type of
data in the use of access control system, so this is not a metric for our study. The
knowledge/skill is essential for administrators to make sound decisions on setting up access
control policies, so we include this in our measurements.

The measurements for each single task are defined in Table 10. Measurement for the whole
system is defined in Table 11. The task perception section in Table 10 is an effort to
understand what kinds of tasks appear more difficult and what could be done to mitigate
the situation. The ease of learnability in Table 11 is to measure the difficulty to learn to use
the specific access control system.

Table 10 Measurements for a Task
Goal

Measurements

Effectiveness
Efficiency

How to measure

Who

Task complete

Yes/No

By result evaluator

Solution accuracy

Percentile

By result evaluator

Time

Quantity

By participants

Scale level

By participants

Scale level

By participants

Task difficulty
Task

level

perception

Task knowledge
requirements

Table 11 Measurements for an Access Control System
Goal

Measurements

How to measure Who

91

Satisfaction on the
Satisfaction commands of each

Scale level

By participants

Scale level

By participants

access control system
Ease of learnability of
Learnability each access control
system

8.5 Study Methodologies
We conducted our user study on two Linux distributions, specifically, Fedora core 18 and
openSUSE 11.4. Traditional UNIX access control and SELinux were set up on Fedora
system. While the file system firewall system was setup on openSUSE. Under Linux, the
active components are the users and processes. Access control systems under Linux define
which user or process can access specified system resources. In our study, the resources
are files and directories only; we did not set up tasks on other resources such as signals or
devices.

8.5.1 Participants
There were twelve (all male) participants in our study. We did two pilot studies on two
more experienced participants. One was an undergraduate student who had worked in
campus IT department. The other was a graduate student doing advanced study in access
control. The pilot studies helped clear certain confusions and make modifications to the
tasks, reading materials and environment settings. The remaining ten took part in the final
study. Of the twelve people in total, three were college students in CS, eight were CS
graduate students and one was a faculty. The questionnaires showed that 100% percent of
participants had used UNIX DAC system, from seldom to daily. While 70% of the
participants had never used SELinux, the other 30% rarely used SELinux. Since FSF is
new, no one had used it before. The user study was done in a five-day series of sessions.
Participants chose time slots that worked for them. It took 1.5-2 hours for most participants
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to complete the study. One devoted participant worked on the study for about 3 hours. Two
participants did not finish the entire study; they left after they finished tasks on UNIX DAC.
All the other participants finished the study completely.

8.5.2 Procedure
Before the study, the participants were given reading materials and papers describing the
tasks to be completed. We then gave them a short explanation of the user study and a review
of each of the access control systems. Next, we explained the reading materials and
answered the questions they had. Then they used computers to finish the tasks using
handouts together with related reading materials. Participants chose the order of
completion of the tasks. We used recordMyDesktop software to record the screen of each
participant during the process. Participants were allowed to ask questions on the access
control systems, tasks and reading materials, as long as the questions were not about how
to finish the tasks. They were allowed to take breaks, or leave when they do not want to
continue the study. The questionnaire was completed last.

8.5.3 Data Collection
We collected data in three ways. One was to save the task results on the computer. Before
the user study, we set up the environment and cleared the related settings and files. After
each participant finished the study, we saved the task results and answers into files from
the computer they used. The second one was to save the video records. We used
recordMyDesktop to record the screen during the time that participants were working on
the computers. After each user study, we saved the video files. The questionnaire was the
third way of collecting data from the participants.
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8.6 Results
8.6.1 Results on Each Access Control System
Table 12 shows the results of UNIX access control tasks. The “Complete Success” column
lists percentage of participants that finished all the tasks correctly. The “Accuracy” column
shows the mean of accuracy scores from all participants.

Tasks of part 1 are more basic operations involving understanding of groups, permission
bits and sudoers configurations. The accuracy of these operations is over 70%. Tasks in
part 2 are more comprehensive tasks, which are to read and write access control settings to
confine a process. The accuracy is below 50%.

Table 12 UNIX Access Control Tasks Results
Partial Success Failure

(out of 12)

(out of 12)

(out of 12) (%)

1 12 (100%)

0

0

100

2.4

2 6 (50%)

6 (50%)

0

88

7

3 7 (58%)

3 (25%)

2 (17%)

73

1.4

4 7 (58%)

5 (42%)

0

79

5

5 8 (67%)

4 (33%)

0

87

7.6

6 5 (42%)

1 (8%)

6 (50%)

48

6.4

7 3 (25%)

5 (42%)

4 (33%)

46

12.1

Part 2

Part 1

Task

Average

Table 13 SELinux Tasks Results
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Score

Average

Success

Time
(min)

Part2

Part1

Task

Compete

Partial

Complete

Average

Average

Success

Success

Fail

Score

Time

(out of 10)

(out of 10)

(out of 10)

(%)

(min)

1

1(10%)

0

0

100

2.5

2

3(30%)

7(70%)

0

74.5

12.3

3

7(70%)

2(20%)

1(10%)

79

11.2

4

8(80%)

0

2(20%)

80

19.7

5

5(50%)

0

5(50%)

50

11

6

1(10%)

4(40%)

5(50%)

42.5

20

Table 13 gives the results of SELinux tasks. Similar to the UNIX DAC access control tasks,
participants performed better on the part 1 tasks, which were single tasks, than on the more
comprehensive tasks in part2. All participants spent more time on each of the SELinux
tasks than UNIX DAC. Apparently reading a security policy takes almost half of the time
required to set up a policy for both the UNIX DAC system and SELinux system.

Table 14 File System Firewall Tasks Results

Part2

Part1

Task

Average

Compete Success Partial Success Complete Fail

Average

(out of 10)

(out of 10)

(out of 10)

Score (%)

1

10

0

0

100

6.4

2

6

4

0

80

3.4

3

9

1

0

96

4.6

4

10

0

0

100

5.4

5

9

1

0

96

4.4

95

Time
(min)

Table 14 gives the results on the FSF tasks. Different from the other two access control
systems, there is no significant difference between the accuracies for different tasks, even
the ones in part 2. The first task was the first use of this system for each participant. The
average time for the first task is longer. Specifications of access control policies are similar
among different tasks, so the scores are not as different as in the other two access control
systems. Reading the policies (task 4) took more time than writing the policies (task 5).

8.7 Overall Explanation of the Results
Table 15 Average Scores of Three Access Control Systems (%)
Task

Part1

Part2

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

UNIX DAC

100

88

73

79

87

48

46

SELinux

100

74.5

79

80

N/A 50

42.5

FSF

100

80

96

N/A

N/A 100

96

Table 15 is a summary of Table 12, 13, and 14 on accuracy. Participants can accomplish
part1 tasks (basic operations) with an accuracy higher than 70. The last two tasks for all
three systems were reading an existing security setup for a process, and setting up security
schemes for a process. To set up a confined environment in UNIX DAC, two popular
approaches are using chroot jail, and manipulating UID, GID and permission bits. Due to
time constraints, we did not put the chroot jail approach on the task list. The approach using
UID, GID and permission bits does not create a complete, self-contained statement of the
solution of the task. The settings are on related files and in the system. On the other hand,
the complete security policy specification can be found in the policy files on a SELinux
system. This explains why participants score more reading existing SELinux policies than
UNIX DAC security setups.
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The questionnaires showed that 100% percent of participants had used UNIX DAC system,
from seldom to daily. While 70% of the participants had never used SELinux, the other
30% rarely used SELinux. We had expected the participants to achieve higher accuracy on
UNIX DAC than SELinux. Participants did spend more time on SELinux tasks than UNIX
DAC tasks. However, in Table 9, the accuracy differences between the two were not
dramatic. One reason is that we provided participants with sufficient explanation and
examples on related Boolean variables, SELinux types that should be set, and policy
macros used in the SELinux policy files. On the other hand, we specified clearly in the task
descriptions what permissions that the confined process should have over different
resources.

On a production system, in order to setup SELinux policies for a process, the
administrator at least needs to know:
1a. What resources should the current process have access to?
1b. What SELinux types do these resources belong to?
2a. What access permissions should the current process have over each of these
resources?
2b. What are the appropriate permissions defined in SELinux? (SELinux provides finegrain access control, one real world permission could be mapped to several SELinux
permissions. SELinux has certain macros defined. Understanding these macros
would make this part easier.)
3a. What relations does the current process have with other existing processes?
3b. What interfaces should be used or defined?

Among these questions, 1a, 2a and 3a are about understanding the system and the current
process. 1b, 2b and 3b are about learning to use SELinux. For standard system daemons,
experienced administrators would easily come up with answers to these questions.
97

However, for a new daemon or a new application, this would require testing and debugging
related SELinux modules. The point is that we provided participants with sufficient
information to answer 1a, 2a and 3a, so they only needed to focus on learning to use
SELinux. Even through the scores of UNIX DAC and SELinux in the table are not
significantly different, this does NOT imply that SELinux is as easy to use as UNIX DAC.

The FSF is an access control system that uses filter rules to specify access control policies
over resources. A full discussion of features of the firewall system is beyond the scope of
this paper. We will focus on the user experience. To specify a policy, users need to specify
the target and the predicates on the current filter rule. Then they need to figure out the
relations of this new policy with existing policies over the same resources. It is the same
with all tasks. That is why even the last two tasks, reading and setting up policies for a
specified process did not show much difference from scores of other tasks.

Table 16 Average Overall Rating from Participants
Feature and scale
Mean rating for easy to use (1: strongly disagree; 2:
disagree; 3: neutral; 4: agree; 5: strongly agree)
Mean rating for fast to learn (1: strongly disagree;
2: disagree; 3: neutral; 4: agree; 5: strongly agree)
Mean tasks difficulty level (1: very easy; 2: easy; 3:
moderate; 4: difficult; 5: very difficult)
Mean tasks knowledge/skill (1: not much; 2: some;
3: moderate; 4: a lot; 5: a great amount)
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UNIX

SELinux Firewall

4

2.1

4.6

3.9

2.9

4.4

2

3

1.5

2.4

3.2

2

Table 16 shows the ratings in the questionnaires from the participants. Participants rated
the firewall system much easier to use and faster to learn than the other two access control
systems. The difficulty level and the knowledge/skill level of FSF are both rated lowest.
The simple logic on predicates and multiple filter rules could be one reason. The other
reason might be that the filter rules are more readable to participants since they are closer
to natural language. The concepts of SELinux, new commands, arguments of the
commands, policy file structures and macros do show more knowledge/skill requirements.
The knowledge/skill level is rated highest for SELinux.

8.8 Discussions
Lesson Learned from UNIX DAC
One interesting result was that UNIX DAC did not show much better results on reading
and setting up access control policies for a process than SELinux. Participants actually got
a higher score for reading policies of SELinux than UNIX DAC, even though participants
rated the task difficulty and knowledge/skill level of UNIX DAC lower than SELinux. One
reason might be that access control policies for confining a process or a daemon on
SELinux and the FSF, are much more readable than on UNIX DAC. SELinux and the FSF
use files to save access control policies. So the access allowed by a process is listed in the
files. This makes creating a policy, reading the policy, and making changes to the policy
more convenient. While on UNIX DAC, to confine a process without using the chroot jail,
the setup will be scattered on the system. We observed that some participants look confused
while working with UNIX DAC. They keep changing directories and listing files during
the task to read a policy.

Lessons Learned from SELinux System
One SELinux task was to modify the current httpd SELinux policy to allow the denials of
reading a file. The task could be done using a permissive domain. More precisely, one
could set the daemon domain permissive, run the command which issues the reading
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request to collect denial messages, then install all the extra allowing rules of httpd policy.
This would only require installing the policy once. Another way is to keep the daemon
domain enforcing the current policy, run the command, check for denial messages and
setup additional SELinux policy for the denials. This step is then repeated, until the reading
of the file is allowed. We guided participants to use this second method since this is more
practical on a running system. For this particular task, the participants had to repeat the
above process three times to generate three additional SELinux policy modules (for getattr,
read and open permissions) to finally allow the reading. This is somewhat similar to
debugging code. 20% participants went on with the third modules to finally get a successful
reading. 20% gave up after the second module. 40% gave up after the first module. Most
of them showed frustration after the second module or even the first module.

This task is relatively trivial. The frustration may be caused by their lack of experience.
They did not know what permissions were required and how many were they. Experienced
administrator would not have problems with this task.

However, suppose a new application with complex operations is to be installed,
administrators would face the same problem when setting up SELinux policies? They will
not know exactly what permissions the application needs. If each daemon or application
could have a description of resources and appropriate permissions it requires during
execution, the work to set up SELinux policies would definitely become easier. Especially,
this would greatly encourage new SELinux users.Another task is permanent labeling a
directory. It requires two SELinux commands. 20% Participants missed the second
command for the last directory. This reminds us whenever possible, it is better to make the
necessary steps to accomplish a task as few as possible in access control systems.

Another task was permanently labeling a directory. It required two SELinux commands.
Twenty percent of participants missed the second command for the last directory. This
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reminds us that whenever possible, it is better to minimize the number of steps necessary
to accomplish a task within access control systems.

Lessons Learned from FSF System
On the FSF, most errors occurred because the participants were not clear on the relations
of predicates in the definition, and the logic relations of multiple filter rules. For instance,
some define filter rules with both predicates “uid = Bob” and “uid = Andy”. Since a user
account cannot be both Bob and Andy at the same time, this is a not a legitimate rule. These
mistakes in defining filter rules call for additional filter rule checking and evaluations in
the loadRules program.

Another reason for errors is the lack of motivation to test the security policy setup. This
was common to all three systems. Some participants would not test the results if the testing
required more effort, such as switching accounts. We assume part of the reason is that it is
a study. Real access control users would need to test out their security setups. Yet, this does
suggest we could develop certain auto-test software to mitigate the burden of
administrators.

In the user study, we provided users with a file of example filter rules. We observed that
all the participants opened this file while they edited their own filter rules. We were
impressed by the accuracy of their filter rules. We also observed that most users read the
same man-pages multiple times. Some users tried to look for related problems and solutions
online. This suggests that examples and explanations would be of great help to users.

8.9 Summary and Suggestions
We conducted a study if 12 CS major students using three access control systems. All
participants had used UNIX DAC more or less, 30% participants knew a little about
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SELinux, but had rarely used it. No one had ever used FSF system before. We studied the
process that participants used different access control systems and the results of tasks. They
were able to use the FSF system to solve different tasks with an average score of 94.4. They
learned to use UNIX DAC and SELinux commands to finish basic operations (part1 tasks)
with average scores 85.4 and 83.4, respectively. They could read and set up UNIX DAC
and SELinux policies for a specified process with a score of 47 and 46.3, respectively.

For UNIX DAC and SELinux, with about 30 minutes’ training and reading materials,
participants could accomplish most typical tasks, but they had difficulty finishing more
complex tasks which required certain administrators' expertise. This administrators'
expertise included knowing the SELinux settings of the current system, and knowing how
each confined process was supposed to behave over system resources. Adding a module
that evaluates the relations of predicates on the same filter rule or multiple filter rules on
the same target would improve the usability of the firewall system.

Below are some general suggestions we have learned from this user study.
x

Access control policies on a process or a daemon should be presented so that users
could easily see the entire picture, what the process or daemon can do or cannot do.
Scattered settings cause confusion.

x

Users are not motivated to test the permissions settings, at least in this user study.
Setting up a testing environment can be challenging and time-consuming. Users of
access control systems would benefit greatly from a well-designed auto-test system.

x

Working with SELinux policies is similar to programming in certain ways. Policy
modules include macros and interfaces defined elsewhere. It would be helpful to be
able to read the related macros and interfaces within a policy development
environment.

x

All participants checked the manual pages. Two participants went to online
resources for examples. The example filter rules file we gave in file system firewall
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helped a lot. Appropriate documentations with examples are needed for access
control systems.

8.10 Limitations
The tasks in our study did not cover all the aspects of the three access control systems. For
UNIX DAC, we did not include use of a chroot jail in our study. For SELinux, we only
used the command-line tools. No GUI tools were involved. The user study was done on
Fedora 18. So the results of SELinux should be evaluated in this context. Our participants
were not administrators or experts, so the results and evaluations are from beginner users
of access control systems.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
Current access control systems on operating systems are specified on one single entity,
such as the account ID or DTE domain. This dissertation proposes an access control system
file system firewall (FSF) that specifies the security policy over a programmable condition
which is defined on various attributes of the subject, object and the system. The features of
FSF decide its adoption and use is relatively easy, which is confirmed in the user study we
conducted.

9.1 Contribution
We propose a new type of access control system on operating systems in this dissertation.
The security policies can be defined on various and multiple attributes on the subject, object
and the system of the access requests. We implemented the prototype of FSF on openSUSE.
The performance test of the prototype shows the overhead is acceptable. The redirection in
FSF system can serve not only a security feature, but also a tool that administrators can use
to solve certain problems. This is discussed in Chapter 6. We did a theoretical comparison
of FSF with the well-known TE in SELinux. We implemented TE with FSF in Chapter 7.
Usability is one of the most important feature of access control systems. Only when access
control systems are used, can they take effect and protest sensitive data. We showed the
user study and results in Chapter 8. The ease of use is one of the most beneficial features
firewall model has.

9.2 Future Work
One of our future work is to explore extra attributes that are meaningful in system and user
applications. The prototype of FSF provides a platform to include more attributes.
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Redirection, as a part of FSF, is very useful tools on its own. We want to find appropriate
applications to expand its usage.
The integrity part is another part of future work. We discussed it in the early stage of FSF.
The design of integrity is left to study and research.
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